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The increasingly vocal Islamist opposition to the Saudi regime, which gathered strength
following the Gulf War, lent new urgency to predictions of the regime's demise. The fact that the
Saud family has retained control of the government throughout this period of gloomy forecasting
prompts the question — how has the Saudi regime managed to confound popular expectations and
maintain power in the face of increasing Islamist opposition?
The central thesis of this study is that the Saudi government has prevented opposition groups
from gaining significant popular following or developing power bases by eliminating or controlling
informal networks within Saudi Arabia. This position differs from the most widely accepted
explanations, which center around oil revenues resulting from the 1970's oil boom as the key factor
in the longevity of the royal family. While undoubtedly an important tool used liberally by the Al
Saud, this thesis argues oil revenues are secondary in importance and only part of a much larger and
more significant effort in the regime's struggle against its opposition.
This study assesses whether Islamist opposition can seriously challenge the Saudi government
by analyzing three case studies (concerning Pakistan and Egypt as well as Saudi Arabia) which
consider how Islamist groups organize, what types of organizations are successful in challenging
central authority, and how regimes respond to such challenges. Placing this information in context
with the dominant roles tribe, class, and religion play in Saudi society provides a better foundation
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The increasingly vocal Islamist opposition to the Saudi regime, which gathered
strength following the Gulf War, lent new urgency to predictions of the regime's demise.
The fact that the Saud family has retained control of the government throughout this
period of gloomy forecasting prompts the question— how has the Saudi regime managed
to confound popular expectations and maintain power in the face of increasing Islamist
opposition?
The central thesis of this study is that the Saudi government has prevented
opposition groups from gaining significant popular following or developing power bases
by eliminating or controlling informal networks within Saudi Arabia. This position
differs from the most widely accepted explanations, which center around oil revenues
resulting from the 1970's oil boom as the key factor in the longevity of the royal family.
While undoubtedly an important tool used liberally by the Al Saud, this thesis argues that
oil revenues are secondary in importance and only part of a much larger and more
significant effort in the Saudi regime's struggle against its opposition.
Through comparative analysis with Pakistan and Egypt, this study assesses
whether Islamist opposition can seriously challenge the Saudi government. The
comparison examines how Islamist groups organize, what types of organizations are
successful in challenging central authority, and how regime responses to such challenges
may vary. Placing this information in context with the dominant roles tribe, class, and
religion play in Saudi society provides a better foundation for assessing the future
stability of the Saudi regime than traditional rentier theory.
The Egyptian and Pakistani cases are illuminating in comparison. Although the
IX
Jama' at i-Islami of Pakistan has been one of the most influential Islamist parties in the
world, it has never achieved its goal of establishing an Islamic state with sharia as the
basis for politics, economics and culture. This failure can be traced to three issues— the
Jama'at's elitist ideology and organization, its participation in the political process, and
most importantly, the regime's actions to control and coopt the informal networks which
are so useful in fomenting opposition to an authoritarian regime.
In contrast, the government of Egypt has been unable to develop and implement
policies which would control or coopt the informal networks and associations which the
Muslim Brotherhood has exploited so successfully. This failure can be traced to the
relative alienation of the ruling elite from the masses, a lack of financial and personnel
resources, and most importantly the grass roots nature of the Brotherhood's da W, or
call to God. The government finds itself unable to compete with the extensive social
services provided by the Islamists, and is also unable to benefit from cooption of Islam to
legitimize the state.
The general lessons to be learned from the Pakistani and Egyptian experiences are
applicable to the Saudi case. Indeed, these lessons may be useful in determining the
possible nature of Saudi civil society in the future. First, the Saudi regime cannot afford
to lose touch with the masses, as the Egyptian regime has done to some degree and as the
Jama' at was never in a position to do. Second, repression is not a tool which confers
legitimacy upon a regime. Third, movement away from repression is recommended by
the Pakistani experience. Protracted involvement with the political process creates
barriers to the further progress of revivalism and immunizes the political process to its
challenge. Finally, the Saudi regime cannot allow economic reform to be hijacked by the
economic interests of the royal family, as Egyptian economic reform was hijacked by the
Egyptian elites. Instead, the Al Saud have the opportunity to use both governmental
regulation and informal networks in a beneficial manner, to ensure that the needed
liberalization of the Saudi economy is conducted fairly and efficiently.
Three factors point to the continued stability of Saudi Arabia. First, there has
been no weakening of central authority in Saudi Arabia. Second, the government has not
threatened the interests of substantial segments of the population. Although different
elements of society have voiced dissatisfaction at times, there has been no widespread
dissatisfaction which cuts across tribal, class or religious boundaries. Finally, the Saudi
regime has been very adept at ensuring that religious, merchant and technocrat elites
have maintained their bases of influence and stakes in the regime. This has prevented
any serious efforts to utilize informal networks against the regime. The regime appears
serious about balancing the power of the different interest groups and is slowly working
to institutionalize the relationships which have been built over time.
The ability of the Al Saud to coopt informal networks— patron-client, religious,
occupational and residential— has been responsible for the inability of Saudi Islamist
organizations to successfully challenge central authority. So long as Saudi Arabia's
culture continues to function along the lines of tribe, class and religion, it is likely that




"Shah Arabia; Will the House of Saud go the way of the Pahlavis?" asks the title
of a September 1996 article. 1 Sensationalist headlines similar to this have periodically
appeared since the Iranian revolution of 1979, contributing to the impression that the Al
Saud regime has been in danger of overthrow. The increasingly vocal Islamist opposition
to the Saudi regime, which gathered strength following the Gulf War, lent new urgency
to predictions of demise. The fact that the Saud family has retained control of the
government throughout this period of gloomy forecasting prompts the question— how
has the Saudi regime managed to confound popular expectations and maintain power in
the face of increasing Islamist opposition?
The central thesis of this study is that the Saudi government has prevented
opposition groups from gaining significant popular following or developing power bases
by eliminating or controlling informal networks within Saudi Arabia. This position
differs from the most widely accepted explanations, which center around oil revenues
resulting from the 1970's oil boom as the key factor in the longevity of the royal family.
"In Saudi Arabia, money is the great social lubricator," one unnamed western diplomat
stated.
2 While undoubtedly an important tool used liberally by the Al Saud, oil revenues
1 David Aikman, "Shah Arabia; Will the House of Saud go the way of the
Pahlavis?," The American Spectator, September 1996.
2 George D. Moffett III, "Saudis See Political Change - On Own Terms," The
Christian Science Monitor, 31 October 1990, 1.
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are secondary in importance and only part of a much larger and more significant effort in
the Saudi regime's struggle against its opposition.
Assessments of Saudi regime stability which rely primarily on economic forecasts
and the ability of the government to coopt the opposition with benefits can be flawed
because they neglect two factors. To adequately assess the likelihood that Islamist
opposition can seriously challenge the Saudi government, one must first consider how
Islamist groups organize and what types of organizations are successful in challenging
central authority. Additionally, one must examine the dominant roles tribe, class, and
religion play in Saudi society and how they affect the ability of Saudi Islamist groups to
organize. Taking these factors into account assists in explaining why the Al Saud have
maintained power and provides a better foundation for assessing the future stability of the
Saudi regime.
In Chapter II the general organization of Islamist groups and the significance of
informal networks in Middle Eastern society are assessed. Chapter III contains three case
studies— Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt. Pakistan and Egypt have each experienced
long-term Islamist challenges to the state. Analysis and comparison of these experiences
reveal weaknesses and strengths inherent in different approaches to controlling Islamist
opposition. These strengths and weaknesses are useful in evaluating the Saudi regime's
strategies to control its opposition.
Specific Islamist organizations and significant challenges to the regime are
discussed in each of these cases. To place regime responses to these challenges in
perspective, the roles of tribe, class, and religion are examined and, finally, regime
responses to Islamist challenges are discussed in the context of control or elimination of
informal networks. 3 Chapter III closes with a comparative assessment of what the
Pakistani and Egyptian cases mean for the Saudi case. Chapter IV discusses Saudi civil
society with regard to the comparative findings discussed in the preceding chapter and
examines how informal networks might be used by the Al Saud to improve the Saudi
economy and solidify regime stability. Concluding remarks are found in Chapter V.
3
It should be stressed here that this study focuses on how informal networks are
controlled and coopted through coercion, ideology, and social ties and does not
specifically address how these networks form or interact. A thorough treatment of the
formation and interaction of these various networks would require extensive social and
anthropological research in situ and is beyond the scope of this study.

H. ISLAMIST ORGANIZATION & INFORMAL NETWORK THEORY
During the 1970's a new category of Islamist activists began to emerge throughout
the Middle East. Rapidly growing populations, urbanization, and expanded educational
opportunities led to the development of a new lower-middle class of intellectuals, a class
marginalized by societies unable to provide jobs and status commensurate with
educational achievement. 4 This group would emerge as the cadre for
"neofundamentalist" Islamist movements which appeared so prominently in newspaper
headlines during the 1980's and 1990's. 5
The sociological make-up of these Islamist cadres can be generalized— they are
primarily young intellectuals, educated in Westernized curricula, and in many cases from
recently urbanized families. Recruitment for most Islamist groups is conducted primarily
in "intellectual, urban milieus."6 Since Islamist unrest has typically been an urban
phenomenon, the increasing urbanization of Middle Eastern countries creates an
environment conducive to Islamist recruitment and potential destabilization.
4
Olivier Roy, The Failure ofPolitical Islam (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1994), 48-49.
5
Olivier Roy refers to neofiindamentalism as re-Islamization from below.
Neofiindamentalists preach an individual return to the practices of Islam with an
emphasis on sharia (Islamic law). In this manner they resemble the traditional
fundamentalist mullahs, but are distinguished from them by their "...intellectual origins,
professional insertion in modern society, and involvement in politics." O. Roy, 75.
6
Ibid., 49-50. Also see John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?
(New York: Oxford University Press; rev. ed., 1995), 123.
In Saudi Arabia specifically, the last twenty years have seen rapid migration of
the population to cities. In the early 1970's approximately 26 percent of the population
lived in cities; by 1990 this had risen to 73 percent. The capital city, Riyadh, grew from
666,000 inhabitants in 1974 to an estimated 1.8 million in 1984. 7 As cities were growing
in Saudi Arabia, educational opportunities for Saudi citizens were widely expanded.
At the beginning of the oil boom decade of the 1970's education expenditures per
year were $148 million; by mid- 1980 they had reached $6.4 billion per year. Student
enrollments also experienced dramatic growth throughout all levels of education, with an
increasing emphasis placed on higher education. The 1971 budget for higher education
was $18 million, approximately 12 percent of the total education budget, and by 1984
stood at $3.7 billion, or 46 percent of the total education budget. This over-emphasis on
higher education had two negative consequences— very few Saudis were able or
inclined to accept employment in the mid-level technical or administrative segments of
the workforce and the number being graduated at the higher education level could not be
effectively absorbed by an economy critically short of workers in the technical skill
areas.
8
This pattern repeated itself throughout the Middle East, in Egypt, Algeria, Iran
and the Gulf states. Rapidly expanded educational opportunities created a new category
of educated individuals who found it difficult to secure positions which corresponded to
7 Helen Chapin Metz (ed.), Saudi Arabia: a country study (Washington DC.
Library of Congress, 1993), 106-110.
8 Delwin A. Roy, "Saudi Arabian Education: Development Policy," Middle
Eastern Studies 28, no. 3 (July 1992): 482.
their expectations. 9 These individuals turned to Islam as a means to achieve positions in
society. But how did they organize themselves, recruit members into their organizations
and attempt to foment social upheaval?
Guilain Denoeux chose to examine urban unrest in the Middle East from the
perspective of informal networks. He uses the term network to "...refer to groups of
individuals linked to one another by highly personal, non-contractual bonds and
loyalties."
10 Four specific types of networks are examined by Denoeux— clientelist
(patron-client), occupational, religious, and residential— as he attempts to determine the
causal link between rapid urbanization and instability. 11
Many studies conducted on the phenomenon of rapid urbanization in the third
world during the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's concluded that urbanization promoted
participation in informal associations and voluntary organizations. Furthermore, these
associations and organizations played a stabilizing role by diluting class consciousness
among the poor, sheltering against anomie and alienation, and providing sources of aid
and assistance through kin, neighbors, friends and powerful patrons. 12 Denoeux,
however, perceived that these studies tended to neglect the potential for informal
networks to play a destabilizing role. Many scholars were quick to point to rapid
9 O.Roy, 93.
10 Guilain Denoeux, Urban Unrest in the Middle East: A Comparative Study of
Informal Networks in Egypt, Iran, and Lebanon (Albany, New York: State University of





urbanization as a primary cause of instability in the Middle East and also one of the
major forces behind the growth of Islamic "fundamentalism." 13
Historically, informal networks in the Middle East played a significant role in
society due to the nature of Islamic social thought, which was opposed to the formation
of organized institutions which might present challenges to the all-inclusive solidarity of
the umma. 14 In the absence of formal political organizations, informal networks therefore
played a key role in mediating between the individual and an impersonal urban social
environment. 15
Informal networks worked at two levels. The first centered on informal ties
extending from family members of the governing elite down to commoners, through key
notables such as ulama (religious scholars) and wealthy merchants. The second consisted
of various voluntary associations, independent of direct participation by members of the






Albert Hourani, "The Islamic City in the Light ofRecent Research," The
Islamic City (1970), 14, as cited in Denoeux, 31. Umma refers to the entire Islamic
community.
15
Marshall G.S. Hodson, The Venture ofIslam: Conscience and History in a
World Civilization, Vol. 2, The Expansion ofIslam in the Middle Periods (Chicago:
University Press of Chicago, 1974), 106, as cited in Denoeux, 34.
16 Denoeux, 34.
Patron-client networks generally provided stability by acting as a "hierarchical
integrator" between society's leaders and the poorer masses. 17 These networks lent
stability to the Mamluk dynasty in Egypt, the Ottoman empire, and Iran under the
Safavid and Qajar dynasties. Such networks of patronage were able to control the
populations of major cities through the distribution of gifts, pensions, jobs and salaries, as
well as through contracts and access to and protection from government. 18
Religious ties and networks also served to stabilize the urban masses through
"...charitable, educational, administrative, legal, and economic functions that we would
now associate with the government." 19 Professional networks developed from kinship
and reciprocal economic ties and obligations, fostering a sense of community among
artisans and shopkeepers. Influential members of these networks would often be
delegated authority to implement government directives dealing with trading and
manufacturing professions. 20 Neighborhood solidarities and networks naturally
developed in the residential quarters of Middle Eastern cities, which were often
populated by people with the same ethnic and religious background and who were often
from the same village. The central authorities would delegate responsibility to informal
leaders of such quarters, known by titles such as shaykh, ra'is, sharif, muqaddam or, in
Iran, kadkhuda. These individuals and their assistants would act as extensions of the






government, sometimes collecting taxes, implementing directives and settling disputes
within their quarter. 21
However, informal networks such as these were not always used to promote
stability. The same ties which could be used to support governments could also be used
to protest against government policies deemed threatening to the interests of the lower
and middle classes. Denoeux hypothesizes that urbanization has caused social
dislocation and psychological and social strains which could be exploited to form
informal groups aimed at reintegrating dislocated individuals and marginalized
populations. However, these informal groups can be tied to counterelites not controlled
by the authorities and can be based on alternative visions of society. Therefore, they
present a direct or potential challenge to the sociopolitical order. 22
Patron-client networks could be used by counterelites dissatisfied with the central
authority. Denoeux points to three situations especially conducive to notables acting as
leaders of popular upheaval: when central authority is weakened, when government
threatens the interests of substantial segments of the population, or when notables feel
their interests and positions of power are threatened by government decisions or alternate
sources of patronage. 23
Religious networks have the greatest potential for promoting instability because








elements offer activists the organizational resources, the following, and the safe havens
which are essential to collective action. Though varying in degrees of freedom in many
Middle Eastern states, the mosque may offer the only safe haven for voicing popular
discontent. Due to the latitude provided mosques, the Friday prayer has proven to be a
powerful tool for those wishing to incite protest against the government. Religious
brotherhoods, such as the Sufi orders and the Muslim Brotherhood, have also offered
potential for destabilization because of their financial independence from the state,
secretive nature, and tremendous popular appeal. 24
Neighborhood solidarities and networks could also be destabilizing. Youth
associations, which provided young men with an outlet for their energies and contributed
to the protection and physical security of neighborhoods, could easily be turned against
outsiders, including the government. Acting as popular militias, they at times protected
the population against government abuses, kept the government at bay to preserve
autonomy, and acted as an extralegal political opposition. 25
Occupational networks, often centered around the bazaar, could act in concert to
oppose unpopular taxes or even to pass political information. The Constitutional
Revolution in Iran is one example of social upheaval made possible by the use of
24
Ibid., 47. Also see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 109-121.
25 Denoeux, 45-46.
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informal networks. In this case, the guilds of merchantmen from the bazaar "...provided
financial support, organizational resources and the rank and file of the demonstrations." 26
During the Iranian Revolution of 1 979, Islamists made extensive use of informal
networks. Patron-client networks played an important part in the radicalization of the
revolution, as lesser clerics used their ties to the new elite to displace older and more
established clerical leaders. The rapid ascent of Friday prayer leaders appointed by
Khomeini in all of Iran's main cities was instrumental in securing victory for the Islamic
Republic Party against the moderate clergy and other opposition. 27
Iranian "bazaaris", a term referring to craftsmen, merchants, shopkeepers and
moneylenders, mobilized against the Pahlavi dynasty during the mid-to late 1970's
because they felt threatened by state policies and cultural trends in Iranian society. Due
to frequent meetings held by the bazaaris, the large number of people who belonged to
the networks, and cross-network contacts, the bazaaris were able to organize
demonstrations, hold coordinated shutdowns in support of the Islamists, and counter
hooligans and thugs hired by SAVAK (the Iranian intelligence service) and the police to
burn shops, stores and homes of merchants. More importantly, the members of the
occupational networks often were connected to the Islamists through religious networks
(belonging to the same houses of worship) and other informal networks in the
26 Ervand Abrhamian, " The Crowd in Iranian Politics 1905-1953," 41, Past and
Present (1968), as cited in Denoeux, 49.
27 Denoeux, 131.
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neighborhoods (tea houses and restaurants). 28 Using these affiliations with informal
networks, Khomeini and other Islamists were able to mobilize the masses against the
Shah.
The Iranian revolution is one historical example of the use of informal networks
and serves to highlight the general principle that informal networks have a dual role—
they can be used to stabilize or destabilize. Informal network theory shows that different
types of networks can be used for either purpose. Determining where these networks
exist and who controls them is essential in assessing the potential for destabilization in
urban societies. Furthermore, the significance of informal networks has long been
understood by Islamist movements, and Islamist manipulation of these networks predates
their use in the Iranian Revolution. The case studies which follow expand upon this point






m. THE USE OF INFORMAL NETWORKS IN SAUDI ARABIA, PAKISTAN,
AND EGYPT
Several factors justify selecting Pakistan and Egypt as case studies to juxtapose
with Saudi Arabia. First, population growth and urbanization trends in Pakistan and
Egypt have been similar to those found in Saudi Arabia. Specifically, the population of
Pakistan increased 250 percent from 1947 to 1981, with urban population growth a
booming 400 percent. 29 In Egypt during the same time period, the population increased
approximately 220 percent, with the urban population in Cairo increasing 400 percent. 30
Second, as in Saudi Arabia, rapidly expanded educational opportunities created a
new category of educated individuals in both Egypt and Pakistan. These individuals
found it difficult to secure positions which corresponded to their expectations and they
also turned to Islam as a means to achieve status in society. 31 Finally, and most
importantly, the Pakistani and Egyptian cases have internal similarities and differences
which prove useful when evaluating the Saudi case.
Pakistan and Egypt are respectively home to long-lived, politically important
Islamist organizations— the Jama' at i-Islami and Muslim Brotherhood. Although
similar in that each organization was founded with a clear sense of mission, both have
29
Farhat Haq, "The Rise of the MQM in Pakistan: Politics of Ethnic
Mobilization," Asian Survey 35, no. 1 1 (November 1995): 994.
30 Helen Chapin Metz (ed), Egypt: a country study, (Washington DC: Library
of Congress, 1991), 104-105.
31 O.Roy, 93.
15
utilized informal networks to challenge the ruling elite, and both have experienced
government repression and coercion, they now enjoy different circumstances. The
Jama' at i-Islami of Pakistan has virtually ceased to be a political force while the Muslim
Brotherhood of Egypt remains a serious and meaningful political threat to the Egyptian
government. The difference lies in the manner in which the respective regimes met the
Islamist opposition and how effective they were in controlling or coopting informal
networks. Where the Pakistani state effectively controlled the use of informal networks
by the Jama' at, the Egyptian government was unable to prevent the Brotherhood from
using informal networks as a source of political and social power. The willingness of the
Pakistani regime to allow the Jama' at to participate in the political process also differs
from the Egyptian policy of banning the Brotherhood from legal participation in politics.
These points are key in explaining the different results.
The Saudi case, in contrast to both the Pakistani and Egyptian cases, provides
little detail about how the regime specifically controls informal networks. Most of the
information provided here is anecdotal in nature, and assessments of Saudi informal
networks are based on inference and comparison. Informal network theory and the
history of Islamist use of these networks, as shown by the Pakistani and Egyptian cases,
make this inference possible. While treatment of this topic would be improved by an in-
depth social-anthropological look at Saudi informal networks, enough evidence exists to
make this a worthwhile endeavor. This chapter will address each of the three case studies
in turn, and close with a discussion of the implications for the Saudi case.
16
A. SAUDI ARABIA
1. Saudi Islamist Organization — Cause and Effect
At the time of the Iranian Revolution Saudi Arabia experienced Islamist protests
which shook the government. On November 20, 1979, Juhaiman al Utaiba, a Sunni from
one of the foremost families of the Najd region, led a force of 500 dissidents into the
Grand Mosque in Mecca. Juhaiman justified the seizure of the Grand Mosque by
claiming "...the Al Saud had lost its legitimacy through corruption, ostentation, and
mindless imitation of the West...."32 Many of the dissidents were from two Najdi tribes
that have traditionally provided recruits for the Saudi national guard, an important
element in the internal Saudi balance of power. Furthermore, "a score of the dissidents
were unemployed graduates of the kingdom's seminary in Medina."33
Shia riots broke out in the Eastern Province two weeks after the siege of the
Grand Mosque. The two towns where riots occurred were relatively underdeveloped,
with inadequate electrification and water supplies and too few schools, hospitals, roads
and sewers. 34 Indeed, there were widespread manifestations of religious resurgence,
particularly among youth, university students, and faculty. Once again in the Middle East




Ibid., 40. Although some of Juhaiman's followers were well-educated, the
majority were lower-class and poorly educated. See R. Hrair Dekmejian, "The Rise of
Political Islamism in Saudi Arabia," Middle East Journal 48, no. 4 (autumn 1994): 629.
34 Metz, 41.
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life. In both instances, the Saudi regime ruthlessly repressed the acts of violence and the
opposition was short-lived.
The events, however, did create a surge of speculation about the stability of the
Saudi regime due to flat economic conditions and the seemingly unstoppable tide of
Islamic activism, exemplified by the Islamist victory in Iran. News reports of the early
1980's spoke of a shaken Saudi Arabia that remained vulnerable to Islamist activity,
contended that the regime would have to ensure religious leaders were given a voice, and
indicated that many observers feared the regime was only a step ahead of trouble. 35
These concerns were primarily based on economic analyses and the assessed ability of
the Saudi regime to provide an increasing standard of living to its growing populace— in
other words, could the Saudi regime continue to buy the consent of the governed?
This conception of political stability resulted from the oil boom of the 1970's and
the vast newfound wealth it gave Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia became a "rentier" state, a
state in which the government relies on the transfers from the international economy for
the majority of its revenues. Oil revenues allowed the Saudi government, directed by the
Al Saud tribe, to become dominant economic players even in nominally private sectors.
Sectors like construction and retail depended on government spending, access to capital
controlled by the government, and licenses issued by the government. The Al Saud
obtained the ability to vest private interests in regime stability, giving advantages to allies
and punishing those who opposed them. Furthermore, the government could provide
5 John Yemma, "Saudi Arabia: Stable, but has an Achilles' Heel," The Christian
Science Monitor, 13 March 1981, 4.
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services directly to the citizenry, such as free education and health care, and subsidized
housing, consumer goods and services. All the new economic tools were used to build
political loyalty.
36
Ironically, the largesse of the welfare state contributed to the rise of internal
opposition. State support of religious and educational institutions and the latitude to
allow them to operate publicly contributed to the rise of political opposition in Saudi
Arabia. 37 As oil rents declined from over $110 billion per year in the 1973-1982 period
to about $22.68 billion per year in 1986, the Saudi state found it difficult to provide the
same level of benefits to its citizenry. 38 By the early 1990's, graduates from institutes of
higher education faced the unfamiliar prospect ofunemployment, which only emphasized
the disparity between what Saudi nationals thought their education was preparing them
for and what they were in fact receiving. 39
The GulfWar in 1990-1991 was a catalyst for renewed Islamist activity in Saudi
Arabia. The new Islamists "...consisted of tens of thousands of young, middle-class
urbanites led by preachers, teachers, and students, mostly from religious universities.
36
F. Gregory Gause, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the
Arab GulfStates (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), 43.
37
F. Gregory Gause III, "The Gulf Conundrum: Economic Change, Population
Growth, and Political Stability in the GCC States," The Washington Quarterly 20, no. 1
(winter 1997): 145.
38 Middle East Markets 14 (January 1987), as cited in Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, "The
price of wealth: business and state in labor remittance and oil economies," International




These Islamists were outspoken, sophisticated, better organized, and more numerous than
the Ikwhan militants of the 1970's."40 These Islamists were also given mass support by a
"...class of recently urbanized bedouins, whose status of relative deprivation among more
affluent urbanites made them eager converts to the activist cause."41
The "insulting" need for U.S. troops to defend the kingdom, perceived
mismanagement of the economy, corruption of the royal family, economic and social
inequity coupled with increasing urbanization, and the impact of modernization and
encroaching Western cultural influences contributed to a growing Islamist undercurrent
which erupted following the war. 42 The first public manifestation of Islamist activity
occurred when a brief petition, also known as the "Letter ofDemands,"was addressed to
King Fahd. The May 1991 petition was signed by more than 400 scholars and religious
activists, including a number of senior ulama, and called for reform in several areas, as
well as more stringent application of sharia. 43
The next act from the Islamist opposition was the issuance of a 46-page
"Memorandum of Advice," signed by over 100 activists, which was unprecedented in the
40 Dekmejian, 629. Juhaiman and his followers called themselves Al Ikwhan, or
The Brotherhood. The original Ikwhan was the brotherhood of desert warriors founded
by Abd al Aziz, the founder of the modern Saudi state. Juhaiman' s grandfather rode in
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bluntness of its tone and the specificity of its criticisms and suggestions. This
memorandum accused the government of a "lack of seriousness" in abiding by sharia and
asserted that the ulama were being marginalized in the policy-making process. It also
demanded the establishment of a religious court with authority over the government in
matters of sharia. 44
The third major action by the new Islamists was the May 1993 formation by six
activists of the "Committee to Defend Legitimate Rights (Sharia)," or CDLR. The
CDLR founders called upon Saudi citizens to contact them with complaints about
injustices, and these actions resulted in a severe crackdown against the Islamists by the
Saudi regime. 45 Islamist activity did not disappear, however, and two bombings in the
kingdom are believed to have been conducted by increasingly militant Saudi Islamists.
The resurgence in Islamist activity in the 1990's has resulted in another wave of
alarmist reports in the press which question the stability of the Saudi regime. In "The
Threat From Within— Saudi Monarch Should Sleep with One Eye Open," Peter
Theroux writes, "The generation of young technocrats that grew up rich and was
educated in the United States, once thought to be on the brink of running the country,






country."46 The implication that finances could catch up with the Saudis is echoed in a
backhanded manner by Christopher Lockwood, writing for the Electronic Telegraph:
"The comparison with Iran just doesn't work," one senior diplomat said.
"This is a far richer country than Iran ever was, and life is still basically
pretty good for most Saudis. People look around the region, especially
since the war, and see much worse governments than this one. The royal
family has the track record of always doing just enough to keep things
under control."47
These assessments of Saudi stability neglect the complexity of the Saudi response to the
Islamist challenge. To fully understand and evaluate regime responses to Islamist
pressures, and to subsequently assess the future stability of the regime and the viability of
Islamist movements, it is necessary to consider the dominant roles tribe, class, and
religion play in Saudi society.
2. Tribe and Islam— Tools for Stability
The modern Saudi state was founded by Abd al Aziz bin Saud, the great-great-
great-grandson ofMohhamed ibn Saud. 48 Abd al Aziz, in conjunction with his Wahhabi
army, the Ikwhan, waged a campaign in 1902-1924 to unify the regions that now
constitute Saudi Arabia. Upon seizing Riyadh in 1902, Abd al Aziz obtained the support
of the religious establishment and established himself as the leader of the Al Saud and as
46
Peter Theroux, "The Threat From Within— Saudi Monarch Should Sleep with
One Eye Open," Jinn [www.pacificnews.org] (12 December 1995).
47 Christopher Lockwood, "Bombers fail to undermine the House of Saud,"
Electronic Telegraph 502 [www.telegraph.co.uk] (7 October 1996).
48
Peter W. Wilson and Douglas F. Graham, Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm
(Armonk, New York: ME. Sharpe, 1994), 39.
22
the Wahhabi imam. From the beginning, the legitimacy of the Al Saud as rulers of Saudi
Arabia was closely entwined with Islam. Upon capturing the Hijaz in 1924, Abd al Aziz
became Khadim al Haramayn al-Sharifayn (custodian of the two holy mosques in Mecca
and Medina).49
This responsibility gave Abd al Aziz a broader perspective on Islam, eventually
causing him to oppose the Ikwhan due to their enthusiasm for pressing their form of
Unitarian Islam upon non-Wahhabi Muslims— often at the point of the sword. To
maintain the integrity of post-World War I borders set up by the British, Abd al Aziz was
forced to take on the Ikwhan militarily. To do so, he went out to the countryside,
building support and talking not only to those who would be fighting with him, but also
to religious authorities, seeking their advice and approval. From this point on, a tradition
of consultation with and subordination of the ulama was maintained by the Saudi
regime. 50
The Saudis have also continued the tradition established by Abd al Aziz of
maintaining close ties with and subordinating other tribes in Saudi Arabia. A central
element of legitimacy in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies is the concept of the
ruler as paramount shaykh. Rulers maintain close relations with the tribal leaders in the
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has taken place in the country, the relationship between the rulers and the ruled has
remained the same. ...Members of the royal family are first and foremost politicians and
only secondarily monarchists. A former American ambassador to Saudi Arabia, John
West, likens them to politicians out on the hustings the week before the election." 52
The population is divided by tribal and class structures, as well as regional
interests. "Each Saudi perceives himself as wearing three hats— class, tribe, and
region." 5 The Al Saud played upon these allegiances by orchestrating marriages to
foster dependency and marginalization, as well as breaking the internal cohesion of the
tribes.
54 The Saudi National Guard, a force headed by Crown Prince Abdallah and
independent of the regular army, has units explicitly organized along tribal lines, and a
study conducted in 1968-1970 showed that 80 percent of all Bedouin had at least one
family member in the National Guard whose salary was essential to family support. 55
Tribal cooption policies extend to the state bureaucracy as well. Persons from
Hijaz, the region with commercial dominance prior to the oil wealth of the 1970's,
enjoyed powerful positions in the government administration until King Faisal was
assassinated. As members of the royal family accrued wealth for themselves and the
October 1981), 23.
52 Sandra Mackey, "A One-man Mideast — Except for Saudis," The Christian
Science Monitor (28 October 1981), 23.
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state from oil revenues during the boom years, they embarked on a deliberate policy to
recruit administrative personnel from Najdi tribes. The Najd region is the home of the Al
Saud and the base of the tribe's support. The Najdi government administrators used their
position to favor other Najdi and Najdi businesses, resulting in the creation of powerful
administrative and commercial classes supplanting the older elite groups based outside
Najd. 56
Tribal values modified state administration, making it an important instrument for
spreading the authority of the Al Saud. Consolidation progressed under each successive
king, with King Faisal increasing central control by making local officials responsible
directly to the king and also by creating a Ministry of Justice to regulate the autonomous
religious courts. 57 Consolidation of power and influence also took place through other
branches of the state bureaucracy:
Oil rents were transmitted directly to the centralized organs of the Saudi
state, which then distributed them through contracts, gifts, interest-free
loans, and subsidies. During the oil boom years, these distributive policies
created a new private sector which mirrored the tribal and regional
composition of the bureaucracy, linking business and government through
kinship networks, tribal loyalties, and business partnerships. 58
The ultimate patron-client network was established, with the Al Saud centered as the
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In the same manner, the state concentrated on consolidating influence and
coopting religious elements within Saudi society. Since the defeat of the Ikwhan, the
ulama have remained subordinate to the Al Saud, yet have been closely consulted and
relied upon to legitimate rule by the Al Saud. With the growth of a state apparatus in the
1960's, the ulama became marginalized in the political arena while maintaining their
state-sanctioned role in the social arena. 59 The ulama were given a role in the system and
in fact became state employees. "For the Saudi government, the trade-off is clear: power
in certain areas in exchange for political loyalty and support."60
The area where the ulama have held most sway is social mores. The volunteer
religious police, or "mutawwa'in," are part of the Organization to Prevent Vice and to
Promote Virtue, a government body which enforces the strict interpretation of social
mores officially sanctioned in Saudi Arabia. 61 The mutawwa'in are particularly
prominent in urban areas, making sure commercial establishments are closed during
prayer times, enforcing restrictions against the production and consumption of alcohol,
monitoring female dress to ensure it adheres to accepted standards, and guarding against
male-female interactions in public places. 62
The regime's influence has even been enhanced in the residential area. District
chieftains, or "umdahs," act as intermediaries between the citizens of the district and








government offices. The umdahs also work with the police in order to maintain order
and security in the neighborhood. 63 Not only do umdahs keep the peace, they also
provide social benefits, such as welfare society loans for weddings. 64 With a
comprehensive appreciation for the breadth and depth of regime influence established, it
is now time to examine regime responses to the Islamist challenges of the last two
decades.
3. Saudi Control of Informal Networks
Following the seizure of the Grand Mosque, the royal family and ulama
united in confronting Juhaiman and his followers. The ulama issued a fatwa (religious
legal interpretation) against the rebels, and the government removed the militants by
force. In this time of crisis, where the power and legitimacy of both the regime and
ulama were challenged, both were able to work together to safeguard their interests. The
Al Saud then concentrated on strengthening tribal ties by increasing financial
distributions to tribal leaders and increasing the number of appearances at various
ceremonial functions by members of the royal family, including King Khalid and Crown
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Prince Fahd. Additionally, more than 60 of the dissidents were beheaded in public
squares throughout the kingdom. 65
The incident resulted in the Saudi leadership reaffirming their religious
credentials by imposing stricter enforcement of religious laws. The regime also promised
that a Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) would be formed as part of an effort to
provide greater input to government. 66 Although the establishment of the majlis was not
carried out until much later, it was an indication that the regime took the unrest seriously.
The Shia riots of 1 979 were successfully repressed by the military, and the regime
began spending more money on infrastructure in the two towns where unrest occurred.
More importantly, the government sharply increased police surveillance and persecution
of Shia activists. Coupled with brute force, the Saudi regime has also systematically
worked to prevent the formation of informal Shia networks. Royal decrees forbid the
building of mosques, funeral homes or community halls by Shia. Existing Shia mosques
and funeral homes have been closed on occasion, Shia books and audio cassettes are
banned, and Shia are not allowed to hold any government positions. 67 Furthermore, Shia
65
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are denied positions of leadership in most jobs, including the oil industry, the Saudi
National Guard and the army. 68
After primarily using the stick for a number of years against the Shia, the regime
eventually brought out the carrot in the 1990's, with King Fahd even appointing a Shia to
the Majlis al-Shura in 1993. As a result of these efforts, Shia dissidents have gradually
moderated their approach to opposing the regime. 69 "Previous critics of the government
have often been brought into the tent by concessions or jobs, and some foreign
newsletters critical of the kingdom have reportedly ceased publication after the Saudis
made them offers they couldn't refuse." 70 However successful the Al Saud were in
dealing with the Shia, their political flexibility and ability to manipulate informal
networks would face the greatest challenge in responding to the Islamist opponents who
gave voice to dissatisfaction after the Gulf War.
The May 1991 "Letter ofDemands" was remarkable for two reasons— it was the
first such petition of demands ever publicly presented to the King and it was
accompanied by two letters of support, one from Shaykh ibn Athemen, a senior ulama,
and the other from the Wahhabi Grand Mufti, Shaykh Abdul Aziz ibn Baz. This Islamist
petition was also in direct response to a December 1990 petition to the king signed by 43
Saudis identified as liberal or secularist. In this petition, the secularists asked the king to
68 Jacob Goldberg, "The Shi'i Minority in Saudi Arabia," in Cole and Keddie
(eds), Shi 'ism and Social Protest, 237.
69 Al-Rasheed and Al-Rasheed, 109-113.
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"...issue a codification of Islamic law that would provide for basic human rights, equality
before the law regardless of race, tribe, gender, or social status, rights for Saudi women, a
Consultative Council, and an independent judiciary." 71
The conservative religious establishment, along with an increasingly radical
neofundamentalist element, felt in danger ofbecoming further marginalized in the
kingdom's power structure. The royal family was stuck in the middle of a tug of war
between modernists and religious conservatives. The first government reaction was to
pressure the religious establishment to disown the more radical element and its attacks
against the regime. Shakyh Abdul Aziz ibn Baz responded for the regime with a
September 1991 criticism of the Islamists and their "whispering campaigns."
Additionally, the senior ulama of the Supreme Authority of Scholarly Research, Judicial
Review, Propagation, and Guidance, led by Ibn Baz, condemned the "Letter of
Demands" as disrespectful of the king. This letter marked the point of divergence
between the official religious establishment and the younger Islamist activists. 72
In response to criticisms and demands for reform and participation, King Fahd
announced three royal decrees on 1 March 1992, establishing a constitution-like "Basic
System of Government," the statute for a new Majlis al-Shura, and a new system of
regional government for the kingdom's 13 provinces. 73 These announcements, however,
71
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did not satisfy the Islamists. In September 1992 the Islamists issued a "Memorandum of
Advice" to Shaykh Ibn Baz criticizing the government's domestic and foreign policies.
The memorandum contained elaboration on the "Letter of Demands," as well as a new set
of even more radical demands. These included the appointment ofulama to oversee and
participate in the work of all government agencies, ministries, and embassies to assure
adherence to Islam, restriction of police powers, and removal of all restrictions on
Islamic clerics, scholars and teachers to write, publish and preach. The regime could not
let this challenge go unanswered and the senior ulama drafted a denunciation of the
memorandum. However, seven of the seventeen senior ulama declined to sign the
denunciation, giving the Islamists a partial victory. King Fahd dismissed the seven
dissenting senior ulama in December, 1 992, replacing them with ten pro-government
ulama. 74
Dekmejian concludes that the Islamists' real intent was to form a policy-making
council independent of the king and that, aside from concern regarding Western cultural
penetration, some Islamists fear socioeconomic modernization because their religious
training leaves them ill-prepared to succeed in a modernizing environment. Furthermore,
"[t]he Islamist quest for power is also motivated by their urban middle-class status and
the desire for upward mobility."75 As Olivier Roy states, "...the appearance of political
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as Saudi regime moves show, any effort by the Islamists to realign solidarity groups
(informal networks) in their favor will fail because of regime cooption and control of
those networks.
As Dekmejian points out, the regional and occupational composition of the
Islamists who signed both the Letter ofDemand and Memorandum of Advice should be
worrisome for the Al Saud. A majority of the signers were from the Najd region with a
large percentage being men of religion. The region and occupational group are both key
elements in Saudi legitimacy. However, these men were not a representative cross-
section of Saudi society, nor were they representative of the power base of the Al Saud;
these men came mostly from non-tribal, urban middle-class backgrounds.
The regime would take the opportunity the Islamist opposition had provided to
strengthen its control of patron-client and religious networks. With implementation of
the Basic Law of Government, what was always implicit in Saudi politics became
explicit— the role of the Al Saud in government, its central role in affairs of state, and
the principle of hereditary succession were codified. 77 Through the establishment of the
Majlis al-Shura and the appointment of sixty members to it, the regime solidified its grip
on Saudi Arabia's ever-important patron-client network. The members appointed
represented a cross-section of the Saudi elite, including regime constituencies like the
77 Madawi Al-Rasheed, "God, The King and The Nation: Political Rhetoric in
Saudi Arabia in the 1990's," Middle East Journal 50, no. 3 (summer 1996): 364.
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religious establishment, technocrats, and merchants. 78 No royal family members were
appointed to the Council, but their influence was to be felt in the third royal decree.
The Law of the Provinces defined the structure of government for the 13 regions,
set out the rights and responsibilities of the provincial governors, and created local
councils of officials and citizens in each province to monitor development and advise the
government. Each region was further divided into two governorates and centers, with the
governors and vice-governors appointed by the prime minister (the king) and responsible
to the Interior Minister. The original 1 3 governors and 26 vice-governors appointed in
1993 were all members of the royal family. 79
While the Majlis al-Shura was populated primarily with technocrats, seats on the
local councils were given mainly to tribal notables and members of prominent merchant
families.
80 By distributing positions of influence between the two interest groups, the
regime solidified its position with regard to each group while enabling conservative and
modernist pressures to balance each other. Just as the Al Saud strengthened patron-client
networks, they also solidified control of religious networks.
To counter the Islamic challenge and consolidate control over the religious
apparatus, King Fahd appointed Shaykh Aziz ibn Baz as Grand Mufti, a state position
vacant since 1970, and created a new Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Call, and
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Guidance. 81 Shaykh Ibn Baz went from critic of the regime to part of it as a result of
Saudi efforts to coopt the religious network of Saudi Arabia. 82 In October 1994 King
Fahd appointed two new committees, staffed by senior members of the ruling family, the
government and the ulama, to oversee Islamic activities in the kingdom. 83 "At the
mosques, sermons and preachers are vetted in advance." 84
In addition to cooption tactics, the regime continued to suppress dissent actively
when needed. The May 1993 formation of the CDLR and its subsequent attacks on the
regime were met with arrests and retributions. The founders of the organization, all
religious scholars and clerics working for the state apparatus, were fired from their jobs
and jailed. Two of the members, Mohammed al-Masari and Saad al-Faqih, were
subsequently released and made their way to London, where they reconstituted the
organization. They proceeded to bombard the kingdom with fax reports detailing Saudi
corruption, misrule, and hypocrisy. The regime responded to criticism by rounding up
over a hundred prominent dissidents who had been critical of the government. 85 At the
same time, the government has appeased religious conservatives by allowing the power
81
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of the mutawwa'in to wax when social unrest against Western culture appears. Some
argue that the regime has allowed mutawwa'in excesses to go unchecked in hopes of
gathering the support of modernizers in reducing the power of the religious
conservatives. 86 It is a balancing act the Saudis have become adept at performing.
Widespread support for the CDLR and other regime critics in the kingdom never
materialized and regime tactics to counter the CDLR in particular appear to have been
successful. Mohammed al-Masari declared bankruptcy after Saad al-Fiqh reportedly
broke off from al-Masari (with the majority ofCDLR operating funds) to set up a rival
organization called the Islamic Reform Movement. 87 Saudi policies worked to
marginalize this group of Islamists and minimize their impact on Saudi society.
Although its efforts have been successful, the future ability of the regime to
maintain control of the opposition is not assured. Continued control of the formation and
activities of informal networks which could be useful to a determined opposition will
depend on decisions made by the Al Saud. Saudi Arabia stands at a crossroads; the
regime could choose cooption and dialogue or it could use repression tactics. An
examination of Pakistani and Egyptian government efforts to combat Islamist opposition
will contribute to an understanding ofwhich would be the wiser choice.
86
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B. PAKISTAN
Seyyed Nasr states, "The Jama' at is one of the oldest and most influential of the
Islamic revivalist movements and the first of its kind to develop an Islamic ideology, a
modern revolutionary reading of Islam, and an agenda for social action to realize its
vision." 88 This vision is of a Pakistan transformed into an Islamic state based on sharia,
with Islam as the basis for politics, economics and culture. 89 To realize this vision, the
Jama'at-i Islami (the Islamic Party) has sought to achieve political power and use it to
transform Pakistan.
Given the chaotic nature of Pakistani politics since the partition of India in 1947,
one might expect that these attributes, coupled with the disciplined and focused
organization imparted on the movement by its founder, Mawlana Sayyid Abu '1-A' la
Mawdudi, would have positioned the Jama' at to become a dominant political force.
Despite these seemingly favorable conditions, Mawdudi and the Jama' at never achieved
electoral success. This prompts the question— why has the Jama'at-i Islami failed to
obtain significant political power in Pakistan?
88 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama 'at-
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This thesis argues that the ruling oligarchy— composed of feudal, bureaucratic
and military elites— has prevented opposition groups, such as the Jama' at, from gaining
significant popular followings or developing power bases by eliminating or controlling
informal networks. By controlling the most viable tool for Islamist opposition to the
state— informal patron-client, religious, occupational, and neighborhood networks—
the various oligarchic regimes have prevented the Jama' at from realizing its vision.
Other explanations for this failure focus on the movement's elitist nature and reluctance
to use populist themes and methods to gain widespread support. Additionally, it has been
argued that the revolutionary goal of transforming Pakistan into an idealized Islamic state
has been hurt by the Jama' at' s participation in the political process. While there is merit
in these explanations, this thesis argues that examination of regime control and cooption
of informal networks will best explain why the Jama' at has failed to achieve political
power and will allow one to evaluate the prospects for Islamist influence upon and ability
to change Pakistan's government.
This section first discusses the Jama'at-i Islami's organization, its significant
challenges to Pakistani regimes since the establishment of Pakistan in 1947, and
alternative explanations for why the Jama' at has not realized political power. To place
regime responses to these challenges in perspective, the roles of kinship, ethnicity, and
religion in Pakistan are examined and, finally, regime responses to Islamist challenges
are discussed in the context of control or elimination of informal networks.
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1. Jama'at-i Islanii — Organization & Challenges
Established in 1941 by Mawdudi, the Jama'at-i Islami was "...an ideological
movement to promote Islamic values and practices in British India."90 In 1947, with the
establishment of Pakistan, Mawdudi split the Jama' at, separating the Pakistani
organization from the Jama' at movement which remained in India. Initially, Mawdudi
continued to stress— in order of importance— "the reform of the life and minds of
individual Muslims," the "organization and training of virtuous men," social reform, and
"reform of the government and political structure." 91 To further these objectives the
Jama'at launched a massive publicity campaign in 1948 to gather support for its demand
for an Islamic constitution. The organization grew to cover a large part of the country,
with branches, study circles and reading rooms in every city and town. Additionally, the
Jama'at "...organized an extensive program of relief work, mobile medical clinics
dispensing free medical care, and an elaborate program of publication of books,
pamphlets, and periodicals. In the major cities, a network of cell structures was created,
each holding weekly workers' meetings, where issues of Islamic ideology and policies
and strategies of the Jamaat were discussed."92
This campaign paid off with the passing of the 1949 Objectives Resolution, which
stated that the Pakistani constitution would be based on the principle that sovereignty
90
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belongs to God alone and that Muslims would be enabled to order their lives in
accordance with Islamic teachings and requirements. The country appeared to be swept
with enthusiasm for an Islamic order and the Jama' at was gaining the support of a large
number of the educated, urban population. However, the Western-educated, modernist
groups in control of the government began to fear this new force and hopes for a quick
Islamization of the fledgling country were soon dashed; a hostile government was not
about to let Pakistan fall into the hands of the Islamists through propaganda alone. 93
In 1951 the Jama'at initiated a new plan of action, involving itself more directly
in politics to further its Islamist goals for Pakistan. Elections in Punjab provided the first
opportunity for the organization to directly back political candidates. Despite
unsuccessful showings by the candidates the Jama'at endorsed, this marked an important
shift in the ideology of the organization. Now the Jama'at was focused on two aims—
clarifying the concept of an Islamic state and training a new generation of leaders who
could shoulder the responsibilities of an Islamically-oriented administration, judiciary,
media, and educational system. 94 An important part of this second aim was the nurturing
of the Islami Jami'at-i Tulabah (IJT), or Islamic Society of Students.
The IJT was established in 1945 as a da'wah (missionary movement). It was
greatly influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, which early IJT members
93
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learned about from Said Ramazan, a brotherhood member living in Karachi. 95 IJT
members proved to be as interested in politics as they were in religious work, and soon
turned their attention to campus politics to counter the growth of leftist student
organizations. 96
This early conflict with Marxism, which escalated from egg throwing to greater
violence, honed the IJT's political skills and its ability to mobilize the masses for
opposition purposes. 97 Indeed, "[m]uch of the political strength of the Jamaat-i Islami,
especially its ability to mobilize the masses to confront the government, depends on the
IJT
"S5
In addition to the IJT, the Jama'at also sponsors trade unions, other labor
organizations, and professional associations. 99 The IJT, however, has proven to be the
most significant of the organizations associated with the Jama'at.
Through the efforts of the IJT the Jamaat has been able to successfully
penetrate and control the educational institutions of the country and
organize the urban youth, who constitute one of its most important
constituencies, under the umbrella of Islamic ideology. The IJT has
helped the Jamaat to impose ideological censorship on educational
institutions, neutralize the influence of secular, left-wing, and liberal-
minded teachers, and intimidate political opponents. It has also helped the
Jamaat to launch agitational movements, whose tactics included forced
closing of educational institutions, street processions, violent protests,
5









demonstrations, and strikes. In short the IJT has helped the Jamaat build
an image of an invincible political force in the country. 100
After the failure in the Punjab elections of 195 1, the next occasion for the Jama' at
to test its growing strength presented itself in 1953. Another populist Islamic party, the
Majlis-i Ahrar-i Islam (Society of Free Muslims) had a history of opposing the Ahmadis,
a minority sect who followed the religious teachings ofMirza Ghulam Ahmad. The
orthodox ulama believe the Ahmadis stand outside the boundaries of Islam. With the
passing of the Objectives Resolution in 1949 and the seeming loyalty of the state to
Islam, the Ahrar became emboldened in their campaign against the Ahmadis. By 1952
the issue had become a national debate and social unrest resulted from the Ahrar stirring
up the Punjabi populace, who were disgruntled because of a poor economic situation,
high prices, and food shortages. 101
The Jama' at took advantage of this popular discontent by organizing
demonstrations to protest hikes in flour prices. This high profile was part ofthe
Jama'at's efforts to keep attention focused on their calls for an Islamic constitution. The
Ahmadi issue, however, soon overtook all efforts by the Jama' at, and Mawdudi felt
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In March 1953 Mawdudi published the most comprehensive denunciation of the
Ahmadis to that date— Qadiyani Mas 'alah (The Ahmadi Problem). Wi The government
of Punjab openly endorsed the demands of the agitators, forcing the hand of the central
government. The army placed Punjab under martial law and Mawdudi and a number of
Ahrar leaders were arrested for violating martial law and "promoting feelings of hatred "
Mawdudi remained in jail until April 1955. By this time the government was inclined to
link the Jama'at's calls for an Islamic constitution with the mob violence seen in the
Punjab, further solidifying government resistance to full-scale adoption of Islam in the
structure of law and government.
Subsequently, the 1956 Constitution only recognized token demands of the
Islamists, with no substantive provisions adopted. Still, Mawdudi and the Jama'at
accepted it as an "Islamic" constitution, for it was feared that a more secular version
would replace it if it was not quickly adopted. The Jama'at was willing to continue the
fight for a more Islamic Pakistan through participation in the political process. This
strategy was successful in the short-term, for in the Karachi municipal elections of 1958,
the Jama'at won 19 of 23 seats it contested. Taking this as an encouraging sign,
Mawdudi began preparing the Jama'at for the national elections which were to follow in
1959 104
Unfortunately for the Jama'at, the military also interpreted the municipal election






General Ayub Khan, assisted by General Iskander Mirza, oversaw a coup in October
1958 and the country remained under martial law until 1962. 105 All political parties were
outlawed during the martial law period, but the Jama' at, unlike other political parties,
was able to remain active "...under the cover of religious, educational, and social welfare
activities and was thus able to keep its organizational network, leadership, and cadre of
workers intact." 106 Thus, the Jama' at was well-prepared to resume political activities
openly when martial law was rescinded in 1962.
Mawdudi undertook a tour of Pakistan's major cities in 1963, speaking at mass
rallies and attacking Ayub's political policies. Realizing that religion alone was not
going to seriously challenge the military regime, the Jama' at entered into alliance with
the secularist opposition to Ayub and at one point even endorsed the candidacy ofMiss
Fatima Jinnah for the presidency of Pakistan. 107 Another part of the Jama' at strategy was
redirecting the efforts of the IJT from confrontation with the left to opposition to Ayub
and his modernist policies. The agitation brought about by the IJT led to arrests and
incarceration, further radicalizing the IJT. 108
The last days of the Ayub regime were filled with urban-based revolutionary
upheaval, not over Islam, but over issues such as wages, prices, and the economic
dominance of twenty-two families. The main thrust of anti-Ayub efforts was focused on
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issues of socioeconomic justice, political participation and regional autonomy. 109 The
realization by the Jama' at that the initiative had passed to the secularists and socialists
led to late support by Mawdudi for the status quo and he entered into discussions with
Ayub on reforming the 1962 constitution with an eye to accommodating East Pakistan's
Awami League and its call for autonomy. 110
The Awami League and Zulfikar Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP)
continued the pressure against Ayub, resulting in his resignation in March 1 969 and the
accession of General Yahya Khan to the post of chief martial law administrator. The
PPP and the Awami League continued to challenge the regime, with Bhutto's socialist
platform questioning the centrality of Islam as the organizing principle for society. The
Jama'at saw in Bhutto's atheistic socialism a serious challenge to the survival of
Pakistan. As a result, the Jama'at fully joined the forces of the status quo to save the
country from socialism and dismemberment. 111
The IJT and other Jama'at-supported labor organizations carried the battle against
the PPP and the Awami League into the streets. In this setting, Yahya announced that
National Assembly elections would be held in December 1970. The Jama'at elected to
participate in the elections as part its battle against the PPP and Awami League. Despite
high expectations, the Jama'at was crushed at the polls, winning only 4 out of 300
contested seats. This defeat caused the Jama'at to reconsider its strategy, leading to the
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decision to focus on power rather than electoral success in the future and to pay more
attention to issues important to the people, such as food and housing. 112
When the Yahya regime decided to take military action against the Awami
League in East Pakistan, the Jama' at' s followers, particularly students from the IJT,
organized themselves into paramilitary units and fought alongside regular army troops
against the secessionists and Indian forces. Although East Pakistan and India defeated
the West Pakistani forces, the IJT members returned home as heroes, turning their
elevated status into sweeping wins during campus elections. 113 This success positioned
the Jama' at and the IJT to oppose Bhutto, who came to power following the surrender of
Pakistani troops to the Indian army at Dacca on 16 December 1971. 114
The Ahmadi problem once again led the Jama' at into confrontation with the
regime. This time, however, the Jama'at was not a reluctant partner, but in the lead. In
May 1974 some IJT students became involved in a scuffle at a train station with members
of the Ahmadi sect. Within 24 hours the Jama'at and IJT were able to stage major protest
meetings in five major cities. Within a month the entire law and order machinery of the
Punjab was in shambles, due to the Khatmi-e-Nabuwwat (finality ofProphethood)
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This protest movement gave the Jama' at and IJT an opportunity to repair
relations with the ulama and gain access to the mosques and madrasas. Relations in the
past were strained by Mawdudi's critique of the ulama' s archaic system of education and
their pre-independence role in politics. The Jama' at exploited this access by holding all
major meetings in mosques; most protest processions were started after Friday prayers.
The Khatmi-e-Nabuwwat movement proved to be a dress rehearsal for the 1 977 Nizam-i
Mustafa (Order of the Prophet) movement, which was instrumental in toppling Bhutto.
In the years between the two movements, the Jama' at strengthened its "...cells and
chapters in labor unions, teachers' associations, and other professional organizations and
institutions, including the civil service and the military." 116
The IJT also remained busy expanding its influence during this time period. In
the November 1976 student union elections held at the University of Karachi, just four
months prior to the scheduled national elections, the IJT won a complete victory. This
came on the heels of the IJT winning 24 of the 28 elections at other colleges and
professional schools in Karachi. This success was crucial to the Jama' at consolidating its
leadership of a "grand right-wing alliance," the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The
PNA was a coalition of Islamic revivalist (the Jama' at), conservative and centrist parties
formed to demand the enforcement ofNizam-e Mustafa and the ouster of Bhutto. 117
116
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Bhutto's socialist policies, inflammatory rhetoric, and turn to the landed aristocracy for
support alienated him from the mainstream and caused great resentment. 118
When the PNA opposed Bhutto's PPP in the elections and lost, there were
charges of election rigging by Bhutto's government. Protests over the alleged rigging
escalated into a nationwide protest movement orchestrated largely by the IJT, which was
able to mobilize its vast organization on campuses throughout Pakistan. Twenty years of
"religiopolitical" struggle had trained the IJT cadres well in the art of confrontation with
opposition forces. 119 By July 1977 the violence had resulted in uncontrollable
lawlessness, leading to a successful coup d'etat by the military under General Zia-ul-
Huq. 120
Zia promised that the establishment of a new social order based on Nizam-e
Mustafa would be the cornerstone of his policies, and hopes remained high among the
Jama'at and its followers that the dream of an Islamic state was finally being realized. 121
Following the coup the Jama'at cooperated closely with the new military regime and the
IJT used government patronage to cleanse Pakistani campuses of leftist organizations. 122
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In August 1978 the Jama' at joined the government, with four cabinet minister positions
filled by Jama' at members. 123 Zia even allowed the Jama' at to place its cadres in
strategic positions within the state-controlled media and the administrative and
ideological branches of the government. 124 With such a large, well-organized,
disciplined, and entrenched organization and an apparently Islamic-oriented military
regime in power, one would expect the Jama' at to finally achieve the political power it
had been seeking.
However, it has been argued that by 1979 the Jama'at had "...become an
insignificant pressure group financed by conservative Islamic countries like Saudi
Arabia, landowners and businessperson[s]." 125 While it could be argued that the Jama'at
remained more influential than this statement suggests, the fact remains that Pakistan did
not become the Islamic state the Jama'at was striving to create and the Jama'at did not
achieve electoral power. What could explain the inability of a movement at the peak of
its power— with exceptional influence over informal networks in the educational,
occupational, and urban areas— to translate its advantages into political success?
Seyyed Nasr has argued that factors built into the democratic political process can
impede the progress of Islamic revivalism. He divides the decisive factors which impede
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revivalism into four categories— "...the impact of participation in the political process,
the nature and scope of the state's reaction to the Jama'at, the extent of control of the
Islamic discourse and vote bank, and the efficacy of the ideological posture and
organizational model to the party's political agenda." 126 For Nasr, the most important
factor causing the Jama' at' s constricted political development is participation in the
political process.
Protracted involvement with the political process creates barriers to the further
progress of revivalism and immunizes the political process to its challenge. 127 By
tolerating debate and free assembly, regimes have deflected scrutiny away from their
policies while appearing to champion democracy. This tactic also encourages other
political forces to respond to the Islamist challenge and often causes ideological ruptures
within the Islamist movement itself, ultimately splitting the Islamic "vote bank " 128
Participation in the political process allowed the Pakistani "...state to formulate policies
that would accommodate dissent at the expense of revivalism." 129 Jordan's experience
with the Muslim Brotherhood has been very similar to this.
While Nasr sees participation in the political process as a long-term explanation
for the failure of the Jama'at, he sees the state's reaction as a short-term explanation. "If
126
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it [the Jama'at] failed to realize its aim of ruling Pakistan and eventually succumbed to
the writ of its long-run involvement in the political process, it is due to direct state
action." 130 Each time the Jama'at made serious attempts at gaining electoral power, 1958
and 1977 in particular, the military acted directly to check the attempts. For Nasr,
however, state action can at best serve only as a stop-gap measure.
This thesis argues, however, that state action to control and coopt informal
networks, particularly the student and occupational networks, is the long-term
explanation for the political failure of the Jama'at. A contributing factor to the state's
ability to control and coopt these networks is the Jama'at's organizational model and
ideological posture. Nasr states, "Even when the Jama'at addresses the concerns of the
masses, its approach is elitist rather than populist." 131
Mumtaz Ahmad agrees with this assessment and points to the Jama'at's focus on
"...elected assemblies, trade unions, campuses, professional organizations, publishing
houses, seminars, conferences, think tanks, and survey research institutes" instead of
mosques and madrasas as contributing to its political failure. 132 By adopting Western
political techniques, organizational technologies and institutional forms, fundamentalist
movements may inadvertently act as agents of change in their societies. 133 Jama'at









programs which were the hallmark of the Jama'at in the 1950's became neglected due to
the focus on electoral politics. 134 The failure in electoral politics is largely attributable to
neglect of the rural areas, where 70 percent of Pakistan's population lives. 135
The Jama' at' s elitist nature and tendency to neglect the masses made it easier for
the different regimes to coopt and control informal networks, thereby marginalizing the
Jama'at. The assessments ofNasr and Ahmad, while true in some measure and useful in
explaining the Jama' at' s failure, do not account for the active role governments took in
manipulating kinship, ethnicity, and religion to counter the Jama'at. Regime actions,
when placed in the context of Pakistan's social and political culture, best explain why the
Jama'at never achieved political power.
2. Biraderi Politics and Islam— Tools for Cooption
In 1947 Pakistan inherited a feudal social order in what had been the western
provinces of India. The political situation roughly mirrored that of Saudi Arabia at the
time of the oil bust; mass politics had taken only modest roots and traditional elites were
firmly entrenched. Many of the traditional religious leaders represented and supported
the status quo. 136 The situation has not changed much in the intervening years and
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elites have built up transregional alliances through matrimonial, political and financial
associations, while the ambitious and well-placed intermediate class— a phenomenon of
the 1970s and 1980s— is demonstrably conservative and stability oriented." 137
For the average individual, ethnic, regional and, most importantly, family
loyalties matter far more than national loyalties. Pakistani social life revolves around the
biraderi, or group of male kin. Traditionally, biraderi referred to residents of a single
village, but increased migration and land fragmentation have led to extended patrilineal
groupings which maintain ties with the home village. 138
Pakistani politics and the economy have come to be dominated by a very narrow
stratum of elite families which control an extremely disproportionate amount of the
country's wealth. 139 It has been estimated that 6 to 7 percent of the population controls
approximately 80 percent of the wealth, with 10 percent expending approximately 70
percent of Pakistan's resources. In Pakistan access to resources equals wealth, and
corruption in Pakistani politics has become legend. 140
Another significant feature of Pakistani culture is its ethnic composition, which
has a major impact on politics. The four main provinces in Pakistan are Punjab, Sind,
NWFP, and Baluchistan and they respectively contain the Punjabi, Sindhi, Pakhtun and
137
Iftikhar H. Malik, "The State and Civil Society in Pakistan: From Crisis to
Crisis," Asian Survey 36, no. 7 (July 1996): 679.





Baloch ethnic groups. Punjab is the most populous province and its landed elite remain a
favored social group, much to the dissatisfaction of other ethnic groups. 141 Punjabi
dominance of the civil bureaucracy and army remains a source of contention in Pakistani
politics.
Against this backdrop, Islam was intended by the Jama'at to be a unifying
force. However, elitism and patrimonialism loomed large in shaping Pakistani politics.
"Politics tended to reflect the stratified character of social classes in Pakistan where, in
general, most citizens see political debates and contests as largely irrelevant to their
lives."
142 What was relevant, however, in the daily lives of most Pakistanis was the
biraderi. It was only natural then for political influence to be sought in terms of the
biraderi— essentially in terms of patron-client informal networks.
Similarly, the Islam of the masses was not the revivalist, Sharia-oriented, and
idealized Islam ofMawdudi and the Jama'at. It was the folk and popular form of Islam
which dominated the rural areas of Pakistan. To influence the masses with Islam, the
most effective vehicle was the informal networks of the mosque and the madrasas.
Although the Jama'at on occasion used these networks, as they did during the Khatmi-e-
Nabuwwat movement of 1974, they did not conceitedly target them. The various
oligarchic regimes— in the cauldron of competing biraderi, ethnic, and regional
141 Blood, 103-117.
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influences— did use and target these informal networks, which is how they were able to
deny the Jama' at political power.
3. Regime Control of Informal Networks
The strongest Jama' at challenges to the oligarchic regimes occurred between
1958 and 1977 and the most significant regime actions to counter Jama' at influence took
place from the initial challenge in 1958 through the Zia regime, which ended in 1988.
This latter time period will be covered during discussion of regime efforts to coopt and
control informal networks.
Following the strong Jama'at showing in the Karachi municipal elections in 1958,
Ayub outlawed the Jama'at and all other political parties. Still, the Jama'at was able to
remain active during the martial law period through its affiliate organizations. Other
measures were required to combat the Jama' at' s growing strength. General Ayub moved
to "...take the monopoly of interpreting Islam away from the Islamic parties to control the
nature and scope of religion's interaction with society and politics." 143 By doing so, the
government aimed to exclude the Islamists from the political process and subject them to
state control.
Under the Waqf (endowment) Properties Ordinance of 1959, the government took
over management of mosques and shrines, and religious endowments were nationalized.
Additionally, Ayub gave the job of interpreting Islam to two ministries— interior and
education and information and broadcasting. These ministries promptly launched a
143
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propaganda campaign questioning the loyalty of the Islamists, their knowledge of Islam,
and even their moral and ethical standing. To devise a new vision of Islam, Ayub turned
to the Institute of Islamic Culture in Lahore and the Islamic Research Institute of
Karachi, which he created expressly for this purpose in 1961. 144 These institutes
provided the intellectual rationale for the campaign against the Islamists. 145
Regime efforts did impede the Jama' at' s ability to push its agenda, but they also
alienated a significant portion of the traditional ulama. The Muslim Family Laws
Ordinance of 1961 and family planning efforts were instituted by Ayub to restrict
polygamy, regulate divorce procedures and improve the life of women. 146 These steps
were also widely resisted and gave the Jama'at enough leeway to build an opposition to
Ayub. This opposition was offset, however, by Ayub's efforts to involve the rural and
bureaucratic elite in his new system of government, which he named "Basic
Democracy." 147 The end result was that Ayub was able to stave off the Jama'at's
opposition until 1969, when issues such as wages, prices and economic disparity forced
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Yahya faced a looming crisis in secessionist East Pakistan. The Jama' at, realizing
the political initiative had shifted to the secularists in East Pakistan and the socialists in
West Pakistan, moved to support the status quo and Yahya. Despite this rapprochement
with the regime, the Jama' at fared very poorly in the 1970 elections, which Bhutto's PPP
won in West Pakistan. Bhutto won through a grass-roots, biraderi-targeted campaign in
his native Sindh, then became leader of Pakistan following the secession of East Pakistan
and defeat of the army by India.
The Jama' at eagerly opposed Bhutto and his socialist policies, but Bhutto was
very skilled at the politics of patronage. He offset the influence of his opposition through
relying on elitist groups to bolster his regime. "Out of the top 50 leaders in his party,
there were 27 landlords, six tribal chiefs, five businessmen, and seven middle class
professionals but only one trade union leader." 149 Additionally, Bhutto attempted to a
certain extent to coopt and appease the Islamists. The revised constitution of 1973 was
drafted under the leadership of a Jama' at member of the National Assembly and turned
out to be the most Islamic constitution to date. 150
In the end, though, Bhutto was unable to balance different factions against one
another indefinitely. His nationalization policies alienated a large enough portion of the
traditional elites that the "grand right-wing alliance," the Pakistan National Alliance,
was able to challenge the regime in the 1977 elections, and then violently oppose the
regime when it suspected vote rigging. As previously mentioned, the Jama' at joined the
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martial law government of Zia in the year following the coup due to their high hopes that
an Islamist government and state were in the making.
Although Zia proclaimed that Islamization was his goal and although he was
believed to be a devout Muslim, his actions prove that for him Islam was just another tool
to be used in the stabilization of Pakistan. Despite plans to implement a seemingly broad
program of Islamization and symbolic moves toward implementing Islamic mores and
laws in Pakistan, it is generally assessed as having been a token effort, aimed more at
establishing his own legitimacy than at changing society. Ayesha Jalal dismissed Zia's
Islamization as nothing more than "...fiddling to the chauvinistic strains in Pakistan's
male-dominated society." 151
Even though he appointed four Jama'at members as cabinet ministers in August
1978, Zia ensured they were largely ineffective. Entrenched bureaucrats and senior
generals opposed any policy initiatives from the Jama'at ministers and not a single
initiative cleared bureaucratic hurdles. 152
Another step taken on the religious front was directed toward coopting the
traditional lower middle class and religiously legitimizing the regime. The government
sponsored religious festivals and rituals, created a religious network ofzakat (alms tax)
and 'ushr (almsgiving), established islah-i-mu 'ashra (reformation of society)
committees, held gatherings such as the milad-un-nabi (celebrations of the birth of the
Prophet), and sponsored qirat (recitations) and na 'at (poetry in praise ofMuhammad)
151
Jalal, 178.
152 Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia," 481.
57
competitions. 153 His promises to protect the sanctity of the chador (veil) and chardivari
(the four walls of a house) spoke directly to lower middle class values. These
government-sponsored activities were aimed directly at minimizing the impact of the
Islamists and at building informal networks between the regime and the masses.
Direct action to curb the Jama' at came in 1984 after the Jama' at became
estranged from Zia, who was becoming wary of the IJT's growing political power. In
1978-1982 Zia encouraged the activities of the IJT to counter the PPP's student
organizations. However, by 1982 these activities were seen in a different light; Bhutto
had been executed in 1979 and the PPP was on the wane. Zia no longer saw himself as
an isolated leader in need of legitimation from the Islamists, especially since he had
found new allies among the nonpolitical ulama. As a result of the changed situation, Zia
was able to hit at the basis of Jama' at power by banning all student unions and
organizations in the country in February 1984. 154
In 1986, Zia directed the provincial government of Sindh to remove a Jama'at
member who had been elected mayor of Karachi and also had the Jama'at dislodged from
the Karachi city administration so that he could install the ethnically-based Muhajir
Quami Movement (MQM). "...[F]or the first time in the history of Pakistan, the state had
taken the Islamic initiative from the Jamaat's hands." 155 Since then the Jama'at has not
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seriously challenged the governments which have ruled Pakistan and has not achieved its
objective of forming a society where Islam is the basis for for politics, economics and
culture.
This failure can be traced to three things— the Jama' at' s elitist ideology and
organization, participation in the political process, and most importantly regime actions
which have controlled and coopted the informal networks which are so useful in
fomenting opposition to an authoritarian regime.
Through the effective use of biraderi politics, juxtaposition of ethnic and regional
rivalries, and cooption of Islam, the various oligarchic regimes of Pakistan have been
able to deny the Jama' at its attempts to gain political power and shape the discourse on
Islam. In contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, after a long arduous struggle
similar to the Jama' at' s, has emerged as the chief political opposition to the Mubarak
regime in Egypt and remains capable of affecting discourse on Islam's role in society.
C. EGYPT
Hasan al Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Mulimin) in 1928
with the aim of returning Egyptian society to a state of purity, reforming it from within,
and purging it of foreign domination and influence. 156 Starting as an Islamic protest
movement against the forces of modernity and change, the Brotherhood evolved by the
1940's into a populist Islamic movement with a vision, like that of the Jama' at in
156 Metz, Egypt: a country study, 5 1
.
59
Pakistan, of Egypt as an Islamic state based on sharia, with Islam as the basis for politics,
economics, and culture. 157 This vision, however, competed with strong currents of
liberalism and nationalism, which were also active against foreign domination and
influence.
Indeed, the forces of nationalism were strong enough to effect a revolution in
1952 and overthrow King Farouk. The Western-oriented liberal elite, under the
leadership of Gamal Abdul Nasser and later Anwar Sadat, shifted Egypt toward a more
liberal and open economic and political system. 158 Initial cooperation by the Muslim
Brotherhood with Nasser's new order quickly turned to confrontation as the Brotherhood
realized Nasser had no intentions of establishing an Islamic state. This confrontation
eventually resulted in state suppression of the Brotherhood, and what appeared to be its
extinction in 1965. 159 What then explains the Muslim Brotherhood's resurgence in the
1970's and its position in the 1990's as the chief opposition to the regime of Hosni
Mubarak?
This thesis argues that despite concerted efforts by the Nasser regime and its
successors to suppress and eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood, the Brotherhood has
survived because of its use of informal networks and government failure to control or
coopt those same networks. The Muslim Brotherhood, and other more radical and
157 Mahmud A. Faksh, The Future ofIslam in the Middle East: Fundamentalism






violent Islamist opposition groups, have developed popular followings and power bases
by either establishing or joining voluntary associations and organizations, then
cultivating informal patron-client, religious, occupational and neighborhood networks
through them. Explanations for why the Brotherhood has remained an active political
force invariably cite the failure of the government to meet the needs of its citizens and the
ability of the Islamists to do so. This thesis argues that the key factor in Islamist
influence is the informal networks which result from social services the Islamists provide
for the masses. Islamist dominance of the social realm stems from government failure
and at times inability to control or coopt the informal networks which the Brotherhood
has found so useful. Furthermore, the continued cultivation of these networks ensures
that the Brotherhood, though not strong enough to overthrow the government, will
remain politically and socially relevant in Egypt.
This section will follow the same general format as the preceding section on
Pakistan. First, the Muslim Brotherhood's organization and its significant challenges to
Egyptian regimes will be discussed. To place regime responses to these challenges in
perspective, the roles of kinship, class, and religion in Egypt are examined and, finally,
regime responses to Islamist challenges are discussed in the context of control or
elimination of informal networks.
1. Muslim Brotherhood— Organization and Challenges
The Muslim Brotherhood initially recruited its members from the lower sections
of the petit bourgeoisie, which had become active due to the rise of nationalism in Egypt
61
after the 1919 revolution. 160 From March to April 1919 Egyptians of all social classes
participated in a popular uprising. This uprising was largely in response to Britain's
actions during World War I, which included forced recruitment of labor and supplies and
garrisoning of Commonwealth troops in Egypt. Soaring prices and unemployment also
contributed to the dissatisfaction and social mobilization of the masses. This activism
eventually resulted in Britain unilaterally declaring Egypt independent in 1922. 161
Although Egypt was technically independent, Britain still maintained a strong
hand in Egyptian politics, actively participating in intrigue between the monarchy and
Parliament. This interference directly spurred the rise of nationalism and the
Brotherhood's initial activity was focused on preaching Islam to counter European
influences and providing services for the masses. By 1935 the organization had
established trade schools and home-based textile factories in over 50 towns and villages
in Cairo and the Nile delta area. Additionally, the Brotherhood established a network of
social service institutions which dispensed assistance to rural migrants who had recently
arrived in the cities. 162
The Brotherhood developed a reputation as an organization genuinely concerned
about the welfare and needs of the people and by the late 1930's the organization was one
of the strongest in the country, with a constituency from a large cross-section of the
population. Its strongest support came from the middle and lower classes, who saw Islam
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as Egypt's salvation. "Indeed, the Brotherhood spoke to the masses in their own
language, the simple language of Islam, affirming the belief that 'Islam provides
thorough and sound solutions to all problems.'" 163 It was in the early 1940's that the
Brotherhood moved to translate this large following into political influence, participating
in the 1941 elections and also in the 1945 Parliamentary elections. 164
Despite its popularity, the Brotherhood failed to win any seats in these
government-rigged contests. 165 Regardless, the Brotherhood stayed at the forefront of the
burgeoning opposition to the westernized elites and the European ties they cultivated.
The organization's growing popularity and power caused alarm, resulting in the first
government crackdown on the Brotherhood in 1948. 166 The Brotherhood was banned by
the regime in early December, which prompted the assassination ofPrime Minister
Nuqrashi Pasha by a member of the Brotherhood on 28 December. This resulted in a
"reign of terror" directed at the Brotherhood, culminating in the killing ofBanna himself
in February 1949 by state security agents and the dissolution of the Brotherhood. 167
Although formally banned by the government, the Brotherhood continued to
function outside the law, carrying out its social, educational, religious, and charitable
163 Faksh, 43. Faksh's quote on Islam is from Hasan al Banna, What Is Our
Message? (Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publications, 1974), 27.
164 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam andDemocracy (New York: Oxford






work through its network of organizations in towns and cities across Egypt. "...[T]his
network of service structures helped to institutionalize the movement in Egyptian life,
giving it strength and durability to become practically an autonomous society— a
society within the larger society." 168 Testament to this strength and durability was the
restoration of the legal status of the Brotherhood by the new Wafd government in 1950. 169
The nationalists recognized the de facto presence of the Brotherhood and deemed
the organization too valuable a resource to ignore. A rapprochement was effected and
the Brotherhood, now under the leadership ofHasan al Hudaybi, cooperated with the
nationalists, actively supporting the Free Officers' military revolt which overthrew King
Farouk in 1952. 170 Brotherhood hopes for movement towards an Islamic state, similar to
the vain hopes of the Jama' at in Pakistan after independence, were soon dashed by
Nasser's emerging nationalist state. A new voice within the Brotherhood came to the
fore, that of Sayyid Qutb, whose influential writings held the military-state dictatorship
responsible for the decline of Islam and rise mjahiliyya (pre-Islamic paganism). 171
Increasing confrontation between the Brotherhood and Nasser's regime primed
the government for repression. The Brotherhood was outlawed in February 1954 due to
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Brotherhood opposition to the policies of Nasser's Revolutionary Command Council. 172
After an attempt on Nasser's life in October 1954, over 1,000 Brotherhood members
were brought before military courts and the revolutionary Peoples Tribunal. 173 Qutb was
arrested and imprisoned for ten years. During his time in prison, Qutb was subjected to
torture, which further radicalized his world view. His prolific writings from prison
turned increasingly confrontational and revolutionary, further antagonizing the state.
In 1965 another attempt on Nasser's life was blamed on the Brotherhood and this
time the government's repression was absolute. Qutb, along with several other leaders of
the Brotherhood, was hanged as the ringleader of an alleged conspiracy against the
government. Thousands of Brothers were arrested and tortured, while others went
underground or fled the country. 174 However, the demise of the Brotherhood's leadership
and apparent destruction of the organization itself belied the ground truth— the
Brotherhood did not cease to be a significant social, religious and political factor in
Egyptian society.
Nasser's repression had only served to radicalize the Islamist movement. "The
intensity of the crackdown, the harsh prison experience, and the prolonged underground
existence radicalized the movement and gave rise to militant splinter groups that split
from the Ikhwan." 175 Over the next decade numerous radical groups emerged, often







under the leadership of former Brothers who had been influenced by a literal and militant
interpretation of Qutb's writings. 176 These radical groups, however, did not represent the
greatest threat to the Egyptian regime. The element of the Brotherhood which rejected
the militant approach was to rebuild the organization, strengthen it, and ultimately
become the main opposition to the regime in the 1 990's.
The mainstream of the Brotherhood was given the opportunity to rebuild the
movement by Anwar Sadat, who succeeded Nasser upon his death in 1970. Sadat felt
threatened by the Nasserist and leftist elements, which led him to reach out to Islam in an
attempt to reduce leftist influence, enhance his legitimacy and mobilize popular support.
Ultimately, this "...led to the reassertion of a politicized Islam..." and "...the resurrection
of a rehabilitated Muslim Brotherhood...." 177
This resurrection was made possible by Sadat's need for political support and the
Brotherhood's decision to adopt a policy of moderate reformism and denounce violence
as a method to achieve its goals. While still not recognized as a political party, the
Brotherhood was once again able to operate openly and recommenced its traditional
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welfare and financial institutions. 178 Additionally, two specific areas were targeted for
cultivation— the neighborhood mosque and the university. 179
These two sites would develop into the greatest sources of strength and power
for the Brotherhood. During the 1970's the number of private mosques in Egypt doubled
from approximately 20,000 to 40,000. "Sadat's early policy encouraged the building of
private (ahli) mosques, which included not only formal buildings but also thousands of
other structures and rooms added to hotels, hospitals, apartment complexes and other
private dwellings." 180 Islamists used these spaces to engage in community work and
relief services. The Brotherhood was spreading its message of "Islam is the way" by
building a variety of educational and health care facilities that mixed the teachings of
Islam with high-quality social services at nominal fees. 181 At the same time, and with
government support, the Brotherhood was busy organizing student associations, or
jama 'at islamiyya (Islamic groups) as they came to be known, in the universities.
Much like Zia used the IJT in Pakistan in the late 1970's, Sadat actively supported
the formation of Islamist student organizations to counter the influence ofNasserist and
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desired. By the mid-1970's the leftists had been marginalized on university campuses.
However, these groups also grew to provide vital goods and services to students.
In fact, their unmatched ability to address the students' needs is precisely
what made thejama 'at so successful. Students unable to buy expensive
textbooks were happy to see thejama 'at photocopy them and sell copies
at only a fraction of the books' market prices. Students having difficulty
taking notes in overcrowded and noisy amphitheaters were pleased to be
able to buy low-cost copies of lecture notes distributed by thejama 'at.
.
.
. Students finding it hard to study in noisy dormitories and unable to pay
for expensive private tutoring eagerly joined the study groups and review
sessions for examinations that thejama 'at organized in local mosques or
in places that they had asked the university authorities to set aside for
prayer.
Thus the Brotherhood developed contacts which would later prove useful in developing
informal networks and recruiting new members. Organizational skills were also honed,
as thejama 'at dominated the student union elections of most faculties since the mid-
1970's.
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Eventually the members of thejama 'at moved on to professional life, where they
used their student experience to become active in professional syndicates. By the late
1980's formerjama 'at members formed an influential constituency within several
professional syndicates and by 1987 they won their first decisive victory in elections for
the Engineer's Association. Even more surprising was the 1992 victory by Brotherhood
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members in the Egyptian Bar Association elections. 184 By the end of that year the
Brotherhood managed to control most of the professional unions. 185 The success of the
Brothers in this arena, as in the student association arena, was attributable to government
policies.
Sadat's program to bolster support and enhance the legitimacy of his regime
included expanded educational opportunities, meant to fulfill and expand part ofNasser's
social contract. A key promise made by Nasser was to provide a government job to every
graduate with a secondary school or graduate degree. Sadat went beyond this, however,
opening universities to an unprecedented number of students and extending the university
system into the provinces. Between 1974 and 1978, seven new provincial universities
were established. 186 The new graduates being pumped out of the educational system
could not be absorbed into the public sector.
The Brotherhood, with financing from Islamic philanthropists (oil money from
the Gulf in many cases), was able to provide jobs to many of these unemployed
professionals. Even those employed by the state found it difficult to make ends meet and
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center.
187 As Saad Eddin Ibrahim puts it, "This strand of Islamic activism has therefore
set about establishing concrete Islamic alternatives to the socio-economic institutions of
the state and the capitalist sector." 188 The Brotherhood and other Islamist groups filled an
economic void left by the state and its ineffective policies.
Sadat, in an effort to improve the economy, implemented a new policy that came
to be called infitah (opening or open door). The policy was meant to increase foreign
investment, create greater participation in the private sector, allow more freedom for
individuals to develop their own wealth and property, and relax currency regulations so
that Egyptian entrepreneurs could have access to foreign money. While shops did fill
with foreign goods, foreign companies built new modern hotels, and new wealth was
created, not much was done for the Egyptian masses, since there was little investment in
long-term industrial or agricultural projects. 189
Sadat's general preference for things western, his enactment of family law
reforms, and the overture to Israel caused the Brotherhood and more radical Islamists to
become more active and vocal in their opposition. "Sadat's 'open door' {infitah) was
seen as increasing Egypt's economic dependence on the West, and promoting Western
cultural penetration, from dress and behavior to television, music, and videos, benefitting
an economically privileged, Westernized elite and thus contributing to a society in which
187
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the rich got richer and the poor became poorer." 190 When the more radical Islamists
became increasingly violent, and the Brotherhood stepped up its criticisms and urged
adoption of sharia, Sadat moved to control the opposition by declaring the separation of
religion and politics, banning Islamic student groups, and attempting to nationalize
Egypt's mosques. 191
This process reached its peak in September 1981 when Sadat ordered the arrest of
1,500 to 3,000 dissidents who represented a broad cross-section of society, including
Islamic activists, lawyers, journalists, doctors, university professors and political
opponents. 192 The "new Pharaoh," as Sadat was called for his increasingly autocratic
actions, pushed the militants to drastic action. In October 1981 members of the Tanzim
al-Jihad assassinated Sadat. After an initial crackdown on all Islamists, the
Brotherhood's leadership managed to separate itself from other radical organizations and
the 1980's became the decade of cooperation between the Mubarak regime and the
Brotherhood.
Mubarak institutionalized Islam to bolster regime legitimacy and counter the
growing appeal of the radical fringe. The Brotherhood in particular was courted by the
regime and relations improved enough that the Brotherhood was allowed to participate
indirectly, through coalition, in the 1984 and 1987 Parliamentary elections. Due to the
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limited number and selective nature of the parties allowed to participate, the scope of
opposition on issues was narrow. Therefore, the personal prestige and patronage
resources of the candidates played a major role in swaying votes. 193 This opening
allowed the Brotherhood to multiply its economic and social welfare organizations and
gain a central role in public welfare that eclipsed that of government agencies. 194
Good relations continued until late 1992. The previously mentioned victories by
the Brotherhood in various professional association elections, especially the Bar
Association which was a liberal stronghold, alerted the regime to the strength and appeal
of the Brotherhood. The Islamist reaction to the 1992 earthquake in Egypt gave evidence
of a capability to deliver social services which the state was incapable of providing.
Regime concerns about Islamist initiative were summed up by the words ofMinister of
the Interior Muhammad Abd al-Halim Musa, who uttered, "What is this becoming, a state
within a state?" 195 In attempting to use Islam as a tool for legitimacy, Mubarak
unwittingly strengthened his most serious opposition.
Responding to this threat to regime legitimacy, the government began taking legal
and extra-legal measures in early 1993 and has continued them to date. Despite these
efforts, the influence upon and potential capability of the Islamists to use informal
networks for destabilizing purposes remains. This thesis argues that regime failure to
coopt or control these networks best explains the success of the Brotherhood. The





efficacy of the specific policies and measures the regime took to counter Brotherhood use
of these informal networks can best be explained in the context of Egypt's social and
religious culture.
2. Family and Islam— Tools for Opposition
In the 1 990's Egypt remains under the social, political and cultural dominance of
an elite. This is a pattern retained since the days of the pharaohs. Although the personal
and ideological values of the elite changed greatly with the 1952 revolution, the gulf
between the urban elite and the masses remains large. 196 Historically, the governing
elite's strategy to control the northern and southern periphery ofEgypt has depended
heavily on a secondary elite, referred to as the rural middle class. Upper Egypt's
intermediary class in particular has been based on 'asabiyya (tribal bonds), as well as
wealth and land ownership. 197
Nasser's 1952 Revolution was followed by a series of programs designed to
broaden the base of support for the new regime. The previously mentioned expansion of
education was one example. The most widely-hailed program introduced by Nasser,
however, was land reform. In Upper Egypt it became entangled in the local power
structure— powerful families, the traditional notables, managed to retain their land and
power, at the expense of weaker and less powerful families. As a result, the sons of these
196 Metz, Egypt: a country study, 113.
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less powerful families received education and the heightened expectations that come with
it, but not the land or the power. 198
The family still remains the most significant unit of Egyptian society and kinship
plays an important role in virtually all social relations. 199 "For the popular classes of
Cairo, kinship is the most significant source of solidarity. Family connections help the
poor households circumvent the legal/bureaucratic constraints to securing shelter,
obtaining jobs and extending governmental subsidies."200 Diane Singerman argues that
"...the family is an important avenue of participation that complements or parallels the
formal political sphere."201 The family becomes involved in informal networks to satisfy
its needs, and the arena where these ties are made is familiar to this discussion.
Discussions of civil society in Egypt stress the importance of neo-traditional
institutions, which have continued to be centers of social and political activity. These
institutions are primarily the mosque and church-based associations, with the majority of
these remaining beyond the control of the government. The use of community places for
social and political activity dates back to the Pharaonic era— what is remarkable about
198
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their current use is that they are "...used by social movements that have modern features,
such as their type of education and organization, to recruit and mobilize supporters
against other institutions and practices of society."202
It is in an environment of scarcity, where ties of kinship are primary, and where
informal networks proliferate, that the government has attempted to control its Islamist
opposition. The failure of the government to provide for the needs of its citizens has
allowed the Islamists to gain influence and challenge the legitimacy of the government.
The policies designed to counter the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood must be
evaluated in this context.
3. Regime Inability to Control Informal Networks
The Muslim Brotherhood's most serious challenges to the Egyptian regime have
occurred as a direct result ofwork done in three arenas. The strength of the Brotherhood
in the late 1970's was a result of the organization's dominance of student associations.
During the early 1990's, the challenge to the ruling elite came in the professional
syndicates. As background to this specific work, the Brotherhood since its inception in
1928 has continually used the neighborhood mosque, and the social service networks run
from it, to build informal networks of influence.
Regime responses have varied, but repression has been one recurring theme. The
use of police and military force, imprisonments, torture, and executions have radicalized
202 Mustapha Kamil Al-Sayyid, "A Civil Society in Egypt?," in Augustus Richard
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the Islamist movement as a whole, and in particular led to the splintering of the
Brotherhood during the 1950's and 1960's. Far from eliminating the Islamists as an
opposition, the repression and formal bans served to drive the opposition underground, to
make them focus on the cultivation of informal networks to get their message across.
Often, the masses have sympathized with the Islamists, who are part of their everyday
lives, who speak the same language as they do, and are concerned about their needs and
welfare.
Additionally, the regime has not been able to maintain constant pressure against
the Brotherhood. After Nasser's death, Sadat found it necessary to rehabilitate the
Brotherhood to balance Nasserist and leftist forces. Mubarak in turn found it convenient
to reduce pressure on the Brotherhood after Sadat's assassination in the early 1980's.
This was part of his attempt to coopt conservative Islam, to increase the state's
legitimacy and marginalize the radical Islamists. In both cases the lifting of pressure
allowed the Brotherhood to make impressive gains in terms of influence and also in
increasing the scope and depth of its social service networks. At best the arrangements
resulted in questionable benefits for the regime, with the downside of increased
Brotherhood influence. Official religious establishment and government-controlled
media were often undermined by fiery sermons delivered by charismatic preachers in
private mosques. 203 At other times the official position offered by the ulama differed
little from that of the Brotherhood. The impact of mobilizing the ulama on behalf of the
203 Esposito and Voll, 176.
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government does not seem to enhance the government's legitimacy, but instead
contributes to the credibility of the Islamists. 204
A second recurring theme has been efforts to reform the economy, with the intent
of being better able to meet the needs of the citizens. Sadat's infitah and Mubarak's
efforts to privatize the state sector and administer international aid funds from the World
Bank in 1994 are representative of Egypt's experiences in this realm. The infitah, as
mentioned previously, was largely unsuccessful and contributed to resentment from the
masses. Western money benefitted relatively few people and the institutions built for the
masses were inferior to the product offered by the Brotherhood.
Islamic social welfare institutions are better run than their state-public
counterparts, less bureaucratic and impersonal...They are definitely more
grass roots oriented, far less expensive and far less opulent than the
institutions created under Sadat's infitah (open door policy), institutions
which mushroomed in the 1970's and which have been providing an
exclusive service to the top 5% of the country's population. 205
In the south, the infitah was actually used by old and powerful feudal families to
reverse some of the changes which occurred during Nasser's land reform program. In
some instances less powerful families were evicted by notables, backed up by
government troops, from lands redistributed under the land reform program. 206
Efforts at privatization also followed the pattern of economic policies being
distorted to favor elites. One reform necessary to facilitate broadly-based economic
204
Al-Sayyid, in Norton (ed), 292.
205
Ibrahim, 643 as quoted in Esposito, 133.
206 Fandy, "Egypt's Islamic Group: Regional Revenge?," 616.
77
growth is privatization of bloated, inefficient public sector enterprises. Only a few of
more than 300 such enterprises targeted for privatization have been sold, primarily due to
the way the procedure has been regulated.
Public-sector holding companies have been allowed to retain proceeds from the
sale of companies they control. This results in the sell-off of only the most unprofitable
enterprises, with proceeds from those rolled into other public undertakings. "The
primary beneficiaries of this sector are the approximately 5,000 comparatively wealthy
Egyptians who comprise the senior management and members of the executive boards of
the state-owned enterprises, in addition to the technocrat-politicians with whom they
share economic rents."207
Economic policies which do not benefit the masses will not generate attitudes of
loyalty toward the regime. Policies which blatantly favor the elite will in the long run
lead to a loss of legitimacy for the government. In the face of competing Islamist
networks of social and economic support services which rival and even supplant the
government's, loss of legitimacy comes sooner rather than later.
Specific regime actions have centered primarily on combating the Brotherhood's
activities in mosques and curbing their influence in professional associations. After
unleashing the forces of Islam to weaken the left, Sadat found the destabilizing potential
of the Brotherhood and other Islamist groups alarming. During the late 1970's Sadat
announced that all private mosques would be nationalized. Out of 46,000 mosques,
207 Cassandra, "The Impending Crisis in Egypt," Middle East Journal 49 (winter
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however, only 6,000 were controlled by the Ministry of Waqf. The remaining 40,000
were financially independent and the regime did not have the resources to actively
supervise such a great number of mosques. 208
Mubarak also issued a futile announcement, in 1985, stating that all mosques
would be nationalized. The government did manage to nationalize a few mosques, but
with limited personnel and money could undertake no large scale effort. Another round
of announcements was issued in 1992, with the first being an October declaration by the
ministry of religious affairs stating that all sermons at state-controlled mosques would be
subject to approval by government officials. Additionally, the construction of private
mosques would be curbed. In November the minister of religious affairs announced that
all private mosques would be nationalized. 209
This latest announcement was in response to successful recruitment efforts by
Islamic activists. Only 30,000 of the 170,000 mosques in Egypt in 1993 were
administered by the Ministry of Waqf. Once again the desired results were thwarted by a
shortage of personnel and funds, but even more importantly also by tacit cooperation
between Islamists and state employees at the lower rungs of the bureaucracy. The effort
was infeasible in any case:
According to the Ministry of Pious Endowments general director, to
maintain a government mosque costs about £E 6,000 per year, and thus
the government can only afford to incorporate 1,000 mosques each year,
rather than the 10,000 it would incorporate were the funds available. In
addition to budgetary constraints, he explained, the government already




has a shortage of 40,000 imams (prayer leaders), as compared to some
5,000 Azhar graduates in 1992, ofwhom only 3,000 showed up for
work. 210
While efforts to police the mosques were mostly futile, regime efforts to curb
Brotherhood influence in the professional syndicates had more of an impact.
As discussed previously, the Brotherhood emerged as a major force in the
professional syndicates in the 1980's. The surprise victory of the Brotherhood in the Bar
Association elections in September 1992 signaled growing strength and influence. The
government was then forced to watch as Islamist relief organizations provided emergency
services to earthquake victims in Cairo the following month. Mubarak, having seen
enough of the growing Islamist influence, took immediate action to curb Brotherhood
influence in professional syndicates. 211
In February 1 993 a new law regulating professional associations was quickly
proposed and passed in Parliament. The law stipulates "...that unless 50 percent of all
members vote in the first round of association elections or 33 percent in a subsequent
round, the results will be voided and the association placed under the supervision of a
panel of appointed judges."212 The law has been criticized as being explicitly designed to
dislodge Islamic leaders— most syndicate elections prior to this law experienced
relatively low turnout, which gave the Islamists, with their honed organizational skills
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and superior networking abilities, a decided advantage. Subsequent legislation further
changed election procedures in the unions and professional syndicates, bringing the
councils for these organizations under the supervision of the judiciary. 213
In April 1994 the Parliament extended the Emergency Law, initially implemented
after Sadat's assassination, for another three year period. 214 In addition to these
measures, action was taken to disenfranchise the Brotherhood and restrict its members
from participating in the 1995 national elections. 215 During April 1997 municipal council
elections, Brotherhood activists were arrested and detained for "stirring up the masses"
on the eve of elections. 216
Once again the cycle of repression and accommodation has turned. It is unlikely
that the Mubarak regime will be able to break the Brotherhood. The more likely outcome
is increased radicalism and regime alienation of the masses.
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SAUDI CASE
The Egyptian and Pakistani cases are illuminating in comparison. Although the
Jama' at i-Islami has been one of the most influential Islamist parties in the world, it has
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never achieved its goal of establishing an Islamic state with sharia as the basis for
politics, economics and culture. This failure can be traced to the Jama'at's elitist nature,
to participation in the political process, and most importantly to regime actions which
have controlled and coopted the informal networks which are so useful in fomenting
opposition to an authoritarian regime.
The various oligarchic regimes of Pakistan have been able to thwart the Jama'at's
attempts to gain political power and shape the discourse on Islam by using biraderi
politics, exploiting ethnic and regional rivalries, and coopting Islam. Merely allowing
participation in the political process would not have been enough to minimize the impact
of the Jama' at. Without a military coup in 1958, it is very possible the Jama' at would
have performed well in the national elections, gaining a toehold which the military,
bureaucratic and landed elites could not have dislodged. By acting directly, the
traditional elites bought enough time to develop policies designed to control and coopt
informal networks, which in the end curbed the power of the Jama' at.
In contrast, the government of Egypt has been unable to develop and implement
policies which would control or coopt the informal networks and associations which the
Muslim Brotherhood has exploited so successfully. This failure can be traced to relative
alienation of the ruling elite from the masses, a lack of financial and personnel resources,
and most importantly the grass roots nature of the Brotherhood's da'wa, or call to God.
The government finds itself unable to compete with the extensive social services
provided by the Islamists, while at the same time being unable to benefit from cooption
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of Islam to legitimize the state. The bottom line remains that the masses will trust those
who fulfill their needs.
Ironically, the Egyptian government finds itself unable to liberalize or privatize its
economy due to clientelism within its own ranks. Without improving its ability to
provide for the needs of the citizenry, the regime can not risk opening the political system
to free and fair competition. On the other hand, repression as a tool for keeping the
opposition at bay is not a viable long term solution unless the government is willing to
live with constant turmoil and the continual threat of armed insurrection.
The Al Saud are fortunate to have a more manageable situation within the
kingdom. They are also fortunate to be able to learn from the experiences of others who
have faced Islamist opposition. Though no two societies are exactly alike, there are
general lessons to be learned from the Pakistani and Egyptian experiences and these
lessons are applicable to the Saudi case. Indeed, these lessons may be useful in
determining the possible nature of Saudi civil society in the future.
First, the Saudi regime cannot afford to lose touch with the masses, as the
Egyptian regime has done to some degree and as the Jama' at was never in a position to
do. The maintenance and reciprocity of informal ties, such as those exercised in the
majlis and those maintained with the commercial elite, will be key to continued strength
of the Saudi regime. Second, repression is not a tool which confers legitimacy upon a
regime. The Al Saud have not been as violent in containing their opposition as the
Egyptian government has, but they would not be wise to consider repression an option.
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Third, movement in the opposite direction of repression is recommended by the
Pakistani experience. An open political process has been key in minimizing the impact
of the Jama' at. As previously stated, protracted involvement with the political process
creates barriers to the further progress of revivalism and immunizes the political process
to its challenge.
217 As the Egyptian case shows, political participation is only effective at
creating barriers to revivalism if it is consistently allowed. It is not a perquisite to be
withdrawn upon a whim.
Banning an activist group from participation in the political process provides that
group with advantages and also eliminates certain risks. The Islamists in Egypt, banned
from participating in politics, have been free to offer specific indictments of the
government while not having to offer their own specific solutions to what seem like
intractable problems. As the Jama' at can attest, it can be much harder to change the
system while working within it.
Finally, the Saudi regime cannot allow economic reform to be hijacked by the
economic interests of the royal family. There are disturbing parallels between the blatant
protection of self-interest shown by the Egyptian elite in their efforts to privatize and
develop the Egyptian economy and the penchant for the Al Saud to use position and
influence to place their economic interests ahead of those of the country. Instead, the Al
Saud have the opportunity to use both governmental regulation and informal networks in
a beneficial manner, to ensure that the needed liberalization of the Saudi economy is
217
Nasr, "Democracy and Islamic Revivalism," 271.
84
conducted fairly and efficiently. If they do so, they should find regime stability and
legitimacy enhanced.
The three case studies highlight the importance of informal networks in societies
which are based on kinship, ethnicity and religion. So long as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and
Egypt remain urban societies driven by ties of kinship, divided by ethnicity and region,
and struggling with the role of religion in society, informal networks will have the ability
to act as stabilizing or destabilizing factors. The manner in which they are used depends
upon the intent and skill of those manipulating them. In the Saudi case, the opportunity
exists for these networks to be utilized in a positive manner, particularly in a way which
can help liberalize the Saudi economy while contributing to regime stability.
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IV. IMPACT UPON SAUDI CIVIL SOCIETY
The concept of civil society used herein signifies the part ofsociety that is
a distinct spherefrom the state, and is composed ofa network ofpolitical,
economic, social, educational, professional, and religious institutions, that
lobby governmentfor their own interests, rather than the interests of
state.
21 *
This thesis has argued thus far that Saudi control of informal networks assures the
ruling family of political stability in the midterm. However, Saudi social control is not
limited to informal networks. The thesis argues below that the regime has effectively
shaped and coopted civil society as well, further strengthening its position in society and
contributing to regime stability. This effort reinforces control of informal networks,
since civil society organizations are often places where informal networks are developed
and nurtured.
The literature on rentier theory argues that civil society in rentier states has been
weakened by the impact of oil revenues, which have allowed the state to undercut
existing social groups and preempt the formation ofnew ones. 219 External rents funneled
directly to state governments resulted in distributive states where the rulers became
financially independent from domestic productive groups. In turn, it is argued, domestic
productivity stagnated, extractive capacities of the state withered, and rulers became
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isolated from the societies they ruled. 220 In particular, new merchant elites had been
created to help displace the old merchant elite and this new elite was weaker due to total
dependence on the state.
More importantly, rentier states were assessed to be less stable than other states
which had gone through the developmental process of elite cooption and coercion that
accompanies extraction of taxes. As a result, the oil states never developed the
institutional capability to coopt and coerce systematically. "Oil revenues, by precluding
the coalition building that is crucial to stability, have left these regimes vulnerable." 221
Another danger ofweak civil society in these states concerns their perceived
ability to cope in the modern international economy. With the economic downturn,
resulting from lowered oil prices and amplified by the huge cost of the 1990- 1991 Gulf
War, came urgent calls for economic reform in the rentier states. To lighten the heavy
fiscal burden on suddenly constrained budgets a number of steps were recommended,
including cuts in subsidies, privatization, and the opening of Gulf economies to greater
domestic and international competition.
"...[I]n the modern international economy of information technologies,
discriminating consumers, and intense competition, only economies which are less
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centralized than those of the Arab world stand a chance of survival." 222 In short, these
economies need to be liberalized. For three reasons, expanded political participation is
necessary to liberalize economically. First, subsidy cuts are equivalent to tax increases,
and taxation without representation begs for opposition. Second, a stable legal
environment is required for a market economy to function. Finally, modern information
technology and unfettered access to information are a necessities for markets to function
effectively today. An authoritarian society which represses information will be ill-
equipped to compete in international markets. 223
Saudi Arabia's first attempts at economic reform in the mid-1980's immediately
failed. The state-sponsored private sector formed a united front and used the
Confederation of Saudi Chambers of Commerce to demand protectionist measures and
other concessions from the state. "Strong tribal ties between the state-created business
class and the Saudi government precluded the successful implementation of a mild set of
economic reforms that aimed not so much to tax or regulate but merely to prune existing
subsidies."224 The concessions won by business were in direct opposition to the state's
aims of cutting spending and liberalizing prices. 225 The failure to implement reform was
222 Alan Richards, "Economic Pressures for Accountable Governance in the
Middle East and North Africa," in Norton, vol. 1, p. 55.
223
Ibid, 77.
224 Chaudhry, "The price of wealth: business and state in labor remittance and oil
economies," 117.
225 Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, "Economic Liberalization and the Lineages of the
Rentier State," Comparative Politics 27, no. 1 (October 1994): 10.
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viewed as an example of patronage gone bad, with a greedy elite unwilling to sacrifice
profits for the good of the country. Subsequent events were to be even more alarming.
After the GulfWar the economic situation in Saudi Arabia had deteriorated even
further. A larger population, steadily growing numbers ofunemployed, budget deficits,
and flat oil prices were the backdrop for the secular and Islamist petitions discussed in
Chapter III. In the context of increased opposition to the regime and a reduced capacity
for distribution of benefits, the regime could not afford another failure. Another failure
to reform would serious impair the ability of the state to provide for the needs of the
citizenry in the long term.
Yet, looked at from another angle, the reform failure challenges the notion that
authoritarian governments result in stunted civil societies which are easily manipulated
by the ruling elite. 226 The activities of the Saudi Chambers of Commerce show at least
one segment of society unwilling to be easily manipulated by the Al Saud when interests
are at stake. Furthermore, an examination of the activities of the merchant class and the
Chamber of Commerce organizations reveals two important details. First, the agenda of
the Chambers is more than simple protection of the economic privileges of the
businessmen who belong to them. Second, the regime retains the ability to exert
influence upon the merchant class, the chambers, and the informal networks which grow
from them.
Prior to the displacement of the Hijazi as the dominant merchant elite, the
merchants won formal representation in the government through the Majlis al-Shura in
226 Norton, vol. 2, p. 5.
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the 1930's. This forerunner to the recently reconstituted Majlis al-Shura was composed
of prominent Hijazis from the major merchant families and provided a direct link
between the Hijazi merchants and the King. 227 Unification of the national market and
consolidation of the authority of the Al Saud resulted in centralization of national
regulatory institutions and eventual replacement of the Hijazi by the Najdi as merchant
elites. When the Ministry of Commerce was created in 1954, a systematic program for
the expansion of the scope of commerce and industry included consultation with
Chambers of Commerce as a key ingredient. "...[T]he growing corporatist relationship
between the chambers and the government provided the channels of communication
through which private-sector preferences became policy."228
The most important aspect of this relationship was that merchants were protected
against "...flagrant conversion of political power to profit..." by the royal family and
government officials. 229 A 1956 law prohibiting the participation of civil servants and
princes in private business was strengthened and stringently enforced when several
ministers were found to be engaging in private business ventures. 230 By the time oil
227 Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the
Middle East (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 71. Chaudhry indicates
the scope of activities overseen by this first Majlis al-Shura was broad enough that the
conventional wisdom of Ibn Saud as absolute monarch should be questioned. In fact,
evidence indicates he was just one of the actors and institutions in the Hijaz and that his








revenues started to roll in, however, the Saudi Chambers of Commerce were state-
funded, the Hijazi were marginalized, and the new Najdi elite began using the chambers
to gain access to key ministries, thus supplementing informal access gained through
numerous joint projects with bureaucrats and members of the royal family. 231
A move by the regime in 1981 to place all the Chambers under the umbrella of
the Riyadh-based Saudi Confederation of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and
Agriculture institutionalized the ascendance of the Najdi elite. The confederation had
exclusive rights to bargain with the government on issues relating to economic policy.
During the recession, these institutions and the informal networks formed in them were
mobilized to defeat reform efforts, particularly through the Riyadh Chamber of
Commerce. 232
The demands of the Saudi business elite were increasingly expressed
through the institutional medium of the chambers of commerce. The
changing role of the Riyadh Chamber, and of the Saudi Confederation of
Chambers in general, reflected the rise of a peak organization empowered
to articulate business demands. 233
It is not surprising then that the regime would move to coopt the chambers before
announcing new austerity measures in 1995 designed to reduce the government deficit.
The measures included higher charges for visas, gasoline, refined products, utilities,
domestic airfare, and domestic telephone service. In a powerful move to marginalize the
231 Chaudhry, "The price of wealth: business and state in labor remittance and oil
economies," 129-130.





Najdi business elite and align the government with the self-sustaining economies of the
Hijaz and oil-based region of al-Hasa, the King reshuffled the cabinet, replacing sixteen
of twenty-eight ministers and reassigning two portfolios. Additionally, the King made
highly public conciliatory gestures toward the eastern province's Shi'a communities. The
new cabinet was virtually without Najdis and had a high representation of Hijazis,
suggesting "...a change in the life cycle of the oil state...."234
A strong political message was sent to the Najdi clients of the Al Saud, indicating
the regime would not tolerate interference with efforts to reform the economy. In August
1996 the president of the Eastern Province Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Hamad
A. Al-Zamil, announced he would be taking over as chairman ofthe Council of Saudi
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (CSCCI), inciting a controversy. The council
positions for the twenty-one chamber organizations are the only elected positions in
Saudi government or industry. The sitting chairman of the CSCCI announced in May
1996 that he was stepping down, but elections were not scheduled until November. The
premature announcement prior to elections leads one to believe that the move was
orchestrated at the highest levels. Of course, Al-Zamil was elected to the chairmanship
in November and the chairmen of the Jeddah and Abha chambers were elected deputy
chairmen of the CSCCI board. 235
234
Ibid., 298-299.
235 See Rashad Awkasho and Edgar C. Cadano, "SCCCI denies differences in
election of president," Saudi Gazette (18 August 1996): 1 and Saeed Haider, "Al-Zamil
assumes chairmanship of CSCCI," Arab News (11 November 1996).
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A government decision to expand the councils of the chambers and appoint one
third of the representatives was another step to strengthen control of the chambers. The
additional representatives are now appointed by the Ministry of Commerce. 236 This is not
to say that the government is clamping down on the chambers. On the contrary, it
appears the chambers are being given greater responsibility for development of the
private sector and the "Saudiization" program. 237
The chambers are very active in efforts to match financiers with private sector
businessmen, having been tasked to do so by the government. 238 Additionally, the
chambers have been given the main responsibility for training young Saudis for various
types ofjobs now held by expatriate workers. Ambitious goals have been set in the five-
year plan for 1996-2000, for instance, to replace some 3 19,000 expatriate workers with
Saudi citizens. To help accomplish this goal, and also to reduce unemployment, the
chambers have set up training programs in partnership with private industry. 239
The commercial sector of society appears far from "stunted" in light of this
activity. Indeed it appears that the chambers could represent a model for other types of
236 Habib Badr, "Al-Jeraisy wins RCCI elections," Arab News (13 December
1996).
237 Saudi Gazette, "Majeed stresses chamber's role in Saudiisation," (26 June
1996).
238
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(5 January 1997).
239 John Cooper, "Putting the kingdom to work; encouraging Saudi Arabians to
join the work force," Middle East Economic Digest 40, no. 14 (5 April, 1996): 55. Also
see Saudi Arabia 14, no. 1, "Training Saudis for Technical and Vocational Careers"
(spring 1997): 13-17.
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organizations which could work within the political space. The example of Kuwait since
the Gulf war could be a harbinger of the way civil society will develop in Saudi Arabia:
...[C]ivil society organizations— be they "traditional" like tribes or
religious groups, or "modern" like chambers of commerce, labor unions,
or social clubs— continue to be important elements in the political and
social life of these states. ...They provide the organizational basis and the
social space for citizens to meet, to talk, and to develop relationships that
sometimes cut across family, tribal, and sectarian lines. When permitted,
as in Kuwait since liberation, they can form the basis ofwhat are, in all
but name, political parties. They are proof that "culture," whether
conceived in tribal or Islamic terms, is not an impediment to social or
political organization in these states. 240
The civil space in Saudi Arabia has already begun to expand, as King Fahd in
early July 1997 expanded the number of representatives to the Majlis al-Shura by thirty,
for a total of ninety members. The national Chambers of Commerce are well-represented
in the Shura and the King has set a definite tone by appointing young, accomplished
problem-solvers. 241 Although the Shura has no legislative ability, meaningful power may
gradually develop in this body.
In addition to nurturing civil society, the government could use the chambers in
the bid to privatize. Privatization has been pursued only half-heartedly until now.
Higher than expected oil revenues have resulted in improved budget forecasts, limiting
the pressure to privatize inefficient industries. For real privatization to occur, the state
must end subsidized inputs and controlled prices, rewrite commercial codes, and, most
240
Gause, Oil Monarchies..., 88.
241 Kevin Taecker, "Private Sector Growth, Fiscal Discipline and Planning: A
Long-term View of the Saudi Economy," Saudi Economic Survey (30 October 1996).
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importantly, end "sweetheart deals" between private businesses and members of the
government and ruling family. 242
By brushing off the 1956 King Faisal law, which prohibited ministers and princes
from participation in commercial business, and applying it to the privatization effort, the
regime might be able to avoid the stagnation which has plagued Egyptian efforts to
privatize. Furthermore, the national Chambers of Commerce could play a mediating role
in rewriting commercial codes and finding acceptable ways to cut subsidies and free
prices. Using the chambers in this manner would likely strengthen the informal networks
between the rulers and the ruled, help increase political participation in a non-threatening
manner, and help liberalize the economy. 243
242 Gause, "The Gulf Conundrum...," 150.
243 For a differing opinion on the utility of the private sector in developing civil
society, see Andrew C. Hess, "Peace and political reform in the Gulf: The private sector,"
Journal of International Affairs 49, no. 1 (summer 1995): 103-122. Hess argues that
"...rather than take advantage of the auspicious window of opportunity provided by the
political changes after the GulfWar to become an agent of political change, the private
sector in the Middle East will not attempt to transform its consultative relationship with
the state into one of competition characteristic of a working democracy."
96
V. CONCLUSION
The bombing of the Saudi Arabian National Guard building in 1995 and the
subsequent Khobar Towers bombing in 1 996 renewed cries that the Saudi regime was in
peril of being overthrown. Renewed emphasis has been placed on examining the
kingdom's financial situation and equating gloomy economic prospects with an uncertain
political future for the Al Saud. Many point to the inability of the state to press economic
reforms from the mid-1980's through the mid-1990's, aimed at curbing subsidies, as a
sign that the Saudi regime will be unable to maintain control of Saudi Arabia. "We who
are so dependent on imports for our oil, should be attentive to the ragged tent of Saud,
whose skirts are flapping dangerously in the first gusts of a harsh desert windstorm."244
These same critics fail to see the strength behind that economic reform failure and
regime ability to shift its patronage to the Hijazi and eastern province merchants. Where
some see weakness, this thesis sees strength. The patron-client relationship between the
regime and its supporters works in a cooperative manner. Therefore, the regime's
decision not to push the subsidy cuts should not be viewed as weakness, but instead as
mutually beneficial manipulation of the client-patron relationship which, in the end,
strengthens regime political stability.
The Saudi government has been running budget deficits since 1983. Economic
difficulties are not new and the Al Saud have weathered turbulent economic seas rather
244 Jim Rogers, "The Crumbling House of Saud," The Baltimore Sun (30 June
1996), IE.
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well. It must be remembered that Saudi Arabia has not always enjoyed wealth and that
the Saudi royal family's dominant position preceded the oil boom of the 1970's. 245 The
loyalties of the Saudi citizenry have been partially gained by the regime through the
distribution of benefits, but it is the ties of tribe, class and religion which provide the
framework for this distribution. Indeed, it is not money but these ties which act as the
great social lubricator. Ultimately, these ties prove stronger than welfare benefits.
The three situations which Denoeux views as especially conducive to use of
informal networks for destabilization do not exist in Saudi Arabia. First, there has been
no weakening of central authority in Saudi Arabia. Second, the government has not
threatened the interests of substantial segments of the population. Although different
elements of society have voiced dissatisfaction at times, there has been no widespread
dissatisfaction which cuts across tribal, class or religious boundaries. Finally, the Saudi
regime has been very adept at ensuring that religious, merchant and technocrat elites
have maintained their bases of influence and stakes in the regime, and this has prevented
any serious efforts to utilize informal networks against the regime.
The religious conservatives have been consulted in policy matters and given reign
in the sphere of social mores. The mutawwa'in in particular have been used to appease
conservative concerns and to check disruptive modernist influences. At the same time,
the modernists have been given voice in the Majlis al-Shura and the regime has worked
to counter neofiindamentalist efforts to stifle continuing modernization. The regime
245 Dunn, 31-34.
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appears serious about balancing the power of the different interest groups and is slowly
working to institutionalize the relationships which have been built over time.
Recognizing that the Saudi regime is strong and stable has implications reaching
beyond the kingdom. According toa September 1996 statement before the House
Committee on International Relations by Robert H. Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern Affairs, the national interests of the United States in the Middle
East include nurturing close relations with our Gulf allies, ensuring the United States'
access to the area's vital petroleum reserves, promoting democracy, respect for human
rights and the rule of law, and enhancing business opportunities for American
companies. 246 At times these goals have not seemed compatible.
Maintaining close relations with our Gulf allies precluded the use of pressure on
issues such as human rights, since such pressure would possibly hurt the legitimacy of
friendly regimes. As a result, the promotion of democracy and human rights has been
selectively pursued, leading to hypocrisy which has a "corrosive effect on America's
standing in the region."247 Although democracy may not be universally applicable, and
championing democracy in the Saudi case would definitely antagonize an Islamic ally,
the stability of the regime suggests that there is room for the United States to publicly
246 Robert H. Pelletreau, "Developments in the Middle East," statement before
the House Committee on International Relations (25 September 1996).
247 Richard W. Murphy and F. Gregory Gause, III, "Democracy and U.S. Policy
in the Muslim Middle East," Middle East Policy 1, vol. 5 (January 1997): 59.
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encourage respect for human rights and the rule of law. 248 The strengthening of civil
society will help Saudi Arabia develop politically and commercially and there are signs
that this process of civil strengthening continues.
In a January 1997 interview, King Fahd hinted that the Majlis al-Shura would be
given greater powers, including wider prerogative to debate government policy and hold
ministers accountable. 249 Then in July 1997 King Fahd expanded participation in the
Majlis al-Shura. Unlike the situation in Iran, where informal networks were used against
a regime which had lost touch with its citizenry, the Saudi situation appears to be one
where the regime has kept touch with the citizenry and is working to engage its citizens
in the process of governing.
In the case of the Shia, the regime has successfully implemented practices and
policies which have not only prevented the formation of destabilizing informal networks
but which have strengthened regime ties to the Shia. The ability of the Al Saud to coopt
informal networks— patron-client, religious, occupational and residential— has been
responsible for the inability of Saudi Islamist organizations to successfully challenge
248 The president of the Majlis al-Shura has stated western-style democratic
elections are un-Islamic, that a precept of the Prophet states office should not go to those
who seek it. For a critique of democracy and its applicability to other cultures see
Michael A. Brookes, "Perils of a Democratic Peace," (M.A. thesis., Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California, 1997). Brookes finds grounds to question the widom of
"democratic peace" as the basis for the U.S. national security strategy of engagement and
enlargement.
249
"Review of Saudi Arabia's Statutes May Affect Consultative Council and
Crown Prince," Mideast Mirror, vol. 1 1, no. 2 (3 January 1997).
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central authority. So long as Saudi Arabia's culture continues to function along the lines
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